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Foreword
This collection includes selected texts presented at two interna-
tional conferences organized by the Institute of Strategic Studies 
in Krakow in 2014 and 2015. The first conference was dedi-
cated to NATO Summit in Newport (September 4-5, 2014) 
and addressed numerous issues which were raised by heads of 
state and government of NATO’s member states. The second 
conference took up the complex problem of relations between 
NATO and Russia following the annexation of Crimea and the 
outburst of armed violence in the East of Ukraine.
This publication offers a wide panorama of issues, problems 
and challenges confronting NATO and the Euro-Atlantic com-
munity in the regional and global contexts. Russia’s aggressive 
stance at the international stage, the Ukraine crisis, the turmoil 
in the Middle East are the most notable examples of risks emerg-
ing outside the North Atlantic area yet strongly influencing NA-
TO’s policy. The economic crisis, defense budget cuts, domestic 
issues and national problems in member states constitute ad-
ditional factors weakening unity and identity of the Euro-At-
lantic security community. As a result, NATO has to work out 
an appropriate response to the problems and challenges piling 
up within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Several authors 
in their contributions to this volume highlight the importance 
of readiness, reassurance and revitalisation of Article 5 of the 
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Washington Treaty. They also point at the need for a reinforce-
ment of NATO’s military capabilities and deterrence potential. 
All agree that NATO must show political unity and determina-
tion to cope effectively with the complex set of security issues 
and dilemmas.
NATO’s policy should follow the path of credible and realis-
tic collective efforts in order to be seen as a token of responsibil-
ity for protection and defense of the territory and population of 
the Euro-Atlantic community. 
Artur Gruszczak
November 2015
Alexander Vershbow
“Defence Matters” – NATO’s 
reactions to the Ukraine crisis 
For 20 years, the security of the Euro-Atlantic region has been 
based on the premise that we do not face an adversary to our 
east. This premise is now in doubt.
Russia’s recent actions against Ukraine have been a wake-up 
call for everyone in the Euro-Atlantic community. They follow 
a pattern of behavior that we already observed in Transnistria, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The pattern is to influence, desta-
bilize and even intervene in countries on Russia’s borders, to pro-
long “frozen” conflicts by supporting corrupt, separatist groups, 
and to thereby deny sovereign states the ability to choose their 
own security arrangements and to chart their own political des-
tinies. President’s Putin goal is to create a sphere of influence in 
Eurasia and to prevent the emergence of stable democracies that 
could call into question the legitimacy of Russia’s authoritarian 
system.
This behavior is more typical of predatory nation-states from 
the 19th century – and it is far from removed from the coopera-
tive and peace-building behavior we expect to see from modern 
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states today. It rips up the rulebook of inter-state relations that 
we have painstakingly written since the end of the Second War, 
and it violates the many principles that Russia swore to uphold 
after the end of the Cold War. It recreates new dividing lines 
in Europe, some 25 years after all of us – including more the 
enlightened leaders in Moscow – erased them and committed 
ourselves to the values of liberty and democracy.
Russia’s actions – altering legally recognized borders by force 
and actively subverting the government of a friendly neighbour-
ing state – pose a  real threat to an open, rules-based interna-
tional system, a system based on respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all states and their right to make their own 
choices without fear of intimidation of interference.
In response, we in NATO have to make a painful and nec-
essary choice of our own. If President Putin continues to guide 
Russia along its present path of aggression, confrontation and 
escalation, we will be forced to consider Russia less of a partner 
and more of an adversary.
This is not a choice that we want to make. Since the end of 
the Cold War, we have tried hard to reach out to Russia. Our 
nations provided substantial economic assistance to Russia after 
1991 and we made it a full and equal member of some of our 
leading global institutions, such as G8. When the new democ-
racies of Central and Eastern Europe sought to join the Atlantic 
Alliance, we made a special effort to ensure that NATO enlarge-
ment went hand in hand with the development of a substantial 
partnership with Russia. We believed that it was in our mutual 
interest for a democratic Russia to be a full partner within an 
all-inclusive Euro-Atlantic security system.
Moreover, to make crystal clear that NATO enlargement 
was not directed against Russia, the Alliance made a  series of 
unilateral commitments to refrain from deploying substantial 
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combat forces or nuclear weapons on the territories of new Al-
liance member states. We partnered with the Russians as fellow 
peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo. And we worked hard to 
engage Russia in dialogue and cooperation on many issues of 
common concern.
Regrettably, while there were some success stories, NA-
TO-Russia relations never achieved their full potential, much less 
the strategic partnership we set as our goal at the Lisbon Summit 
five years ago. The unfortunate fact is that, even before the recent 
crisis, the scope of NATO-Russia cooperation was narrowing as 
Moscow assumed an obstructionist, zero-sum stance on virtually 
all major issues – including missile defence cooperation, non-stra-
tegic nuclear weapons and military transparency.
Now, however, Russia has gone far beyond “agreeing to disa-
gree”. It is expressing its disagreement through unjustified mil-
itary deployments, illegal referendums, and crude propaganda 
reminiscent of Stalin’s times, rather than engaging in an hon-
est debate and search for common ground. And Russia’s lead-
ers appear to be falling victim to their own propaganda, seeing 
a Western anti-Russian conspiracy behind the legitimate striv-
ings of its neighbours for honest government and mutually ben-
eficial cooperation with the European Union and NATO.
NATO Foreign Ministers made clear there is still a  broad 
consensus across the Alliance that engagement with Russia re-
mains our preffered way forward. This crisis is not ideological, 
and we do not face a  renewed Cold War competition across 
the globe with the total paralysis of any cooperation that such 
a  situation would entail. Our past cooperation has borne real 
fruit and, in many areas, this cooperation could continue when 
conditions are right. But we must face the possibility that for 
the foreseeable future, Russia will present a challenge to our as-
piration for a Europe that is whole, free and at peace.
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So far, NATO has responded to the crisis in Ukraine in four 
ways, in tandem with the sanctions and other measures under-
taken by our member states and the European Union.
First, we have reaffirmed our full support for the sovereignty 
and the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the inviolability of 
its internationally recognized borders. In this regard, I am con-
fident that Allies will maintain a  long-term “non-recognition” 
policy regarding Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Second, we have agreed to strengthen our support for Ukraine 
through intensified political and military cooperation. This 
includes helping Ukraine’s armed forces be transformed into 
modern and effective institutions that can defend their country 
against external threats while providing credible deterrence. It 
includes improving the ability of Ukrainian forces to operate 
alongside Allied forces and greater participation in NATO exer-
cises, so that Ukraine can continue to be a contributor to global 
security as we have seen in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and, 
most recently, in our maritime counter-piracy mission, Ocean 
Shield.
Third, we have also reaffirmed our commitment to collective 
defence, deterrence and reassurance for NATO’s own members. 
We have reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is 
unbreakable and absolute, and that NATO will come to the 
defence of any of its members now and in the future. Allies have 
already deployed additional fighter jets to police the airspace of 
our Baltic members. We have begun surveillance flights over 
Poland and Romania. We remain ready to take additional steps 
if circumstances warrant them, and we will apply the lessons of 
this crisis to future assessments of our strategy and force posture.
Finally, we have suspended virtually all practical civilian and 
military cooperation in the NATO-Russia Council framework. 
Our political dialogue will continue to allow us to exchange 
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views on the current crisis and its resolution. But business as 
usual is clearly not an option.
NATO should also assess the implications of Russia’s viola-
tion of the letter and spirit of its obligations, including those it 
assumed in the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 and the 
Rome Declaration of 2002. Clearly, our own assumptions about 
the nature of the relationship with Russia, and the unilateral 
commitments we made in the 1990s, will need to be reassessed.
Russia’s actions put the NATO Summit in Wales in a very 
different light. It was still about “Future NATO” and set pri-
orities for the Alliance for the period after 2014, following the 
completion of our decade-long mission in Afghanistan. Many 
of our Summit deliverables were, in fact, the same. But we will 
need to work towards them with a new sense of urgency, taking 
into account the additional challenge we now must reckon with 
to the East.
A first, crucial lesson from the recent crisis is that we must 
maintain a  strong defence and deterrence in Europe. If there 
was ever any doubt, the crisis now makes clear why we must 
maintain these and invest sufficiently in defence and security, 
and whywe cannot just keep cutting our defence budgets every 
year while others around the world continue to boost theirs.
NATO’s greatest responsibility is to protect and defend our 
territory and our populations. To do that, we must ensure that 
we have the full range of capabilities to deter and defend against 
any threat. This means high-end capabilities to deter and de-
fend against large-scale threats to our territory, and expedition-
ary forces for future crisis management missions. We need to 
be prepared for all threats. And our people and platforms need 
to be ready to deploy wherever required, with the high level 
of interoperability we have attained through nearly two dec-
ades of non-stop operations. This puts a premium on our Smart 
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Defence and Connected Forces Initiatives, including a  robust 
program of training and exercises.
A second key lesson from the recent crisis is that we need 
not only the right capabilities to project stability, but also the 
right relationships. And so we must deepen our partnerships 
with other nations and organizations and explore ways to help 
others to project stability in their own region. This must include 
doing what we can to support Ukraine and our other Eastern 
partners such as Georgia and the Republic of Moldova – in close 
coordination with the efforts of the European Union and other 
organizations. And we must keep our door open for new coun-
tries to join our Alliance, making clear that no outside power 
can have a veto.
Finally, the Ukraine crisis has highlighted the importance of 
the transatlantic bond. In the tough economic climate of the 
past few years, the temptation to act alone – or in some cases, to 
opt out – has been strong. But if we want to protect our shared 
security and our common values, America and Europe must 
continue to stand together, work together, and act together.
The United States will continue to be involved in Europe’s 
security, and that involvement is constantly being updated and 
modernized. We now need European nations to make great 
efforts to match the U.S. commitment – both politically and 
militarily. Therefore, we need to redouble our efforts to work 
together to fill key capability gaps, including missile defence, 
cyber defence, and joint intelligence, surveillance and recon-
naissance. We need to more closely combine our efforts to ad-
dress security challenges on our European doorstep – such as 
Ukraine. And we need to continue to work together on chal-
lenges beyond Europe. The increased danger in Europe does not 
mean we can pay any less attention to challenges in the Middle 
East, Africa and Asia.
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We also need to find a better balance of responsibilities be-
tween Allies – both between the United States and Europe and 
between Allies within Europe. Increased multinational coopera-
tion – NATO Smart Defence, EU “Pooling and Sharing” – can 
make a difference. But ultimately, a better balance can only be 
achieved by adequate levels of defence spending on the part of 
all Allies whether measured as a percentage of GDP or in terms 
of increasing the share of defence budgets devoted to moderni-
zation and investment.
The Ukraine crisis has created a new strategic reality in Eu-
rope, and NATO must respond. It is not too late for Russia to 
turn back from its current path and to seek a peaceful, polit-
ical solution that respects international law and the rights of 
sovereign nations. But if Russia chooses confrontation over co-
operation, NATO will meet that challenge. We will adhere to 
our principles, we will engage constructively with partners to 
support their freedom of choice, and we will continue to protect 
our Allies.

Andrew A. Michta
NATO’s agenda post-Newport:  
From reassurance to reinforcement
The fundamental problem facing the Alliance after the Newport 
summit is the continued decline in resources dedicated to de-
fense and the lack of consensus on how to devise an effective de-
terrent posture along the NATO flank beyond the persistent ro-
tational exercises. While NATO’s Readiness Action Plan (RAP) 
and President Barack Obama’s European Reassurance Initiative 
(ERI) are important steps in the right direction, NATO allies 
need to devise a formula that moves from reassurance to rein-
forcement along NATO’s northeastern flank. 
One of the challenges facing NATO as it seeks an effective 
deterrence formula is that most of the states closest to the Rus-
sian threat represent some of the weakest of NATO’s militaries 
and, with the exception of Poland which has increased its de-
fense spending to the agreed upon 2% GDP, most continue 
to provide only limited military capabilities. Countries like the 
Baltic States, Poland, and Romania want a NATO that prevents 
potential invasions–not one that promises to be there after the 
fact. Unless NATO shores up their defenses with permanent 
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deployments, their security and NATO’s deterrent posture will 
continue to erode. 
At the same time, some in the Alliance still argue that the 
1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act has validity regardless of 
Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its actions in Ukraine. Combined 
with the United States’ preoccupation with the Middle East and 
the shifting balance of power in Asia, the odds against estab-
lishing an effective deterrence regime against Russia along the 
frontier are long. Likewise, the extent of Russian investment 
in select sectors of Europe’s economies has created competing 
lobbies blocking tougher action against Moscow. Finally, there 
is the problem of shrinking defense budgets across Europe and 
the pending further cuts in the U.S. military anticipated in the 
coming year. 
Today the immediate goal of Russia’s irredentist policy in 
Ukraine is to maintain its hold on the east and to consolidate 
its gains there. Putin’s neo-imperial project, whether it succeeds 
or not, aims at reclaiming either direct or indirect Russian in-
fluence over the post-Soviet space. As such, any NATO deter-
rent response has to consider the point that Russian military 
engagement in Ukraine is part of a  larger irredentist strategy, 
accompanied by the gradual tightening of Russia’s grip on Be-
larus and Kazakhstan after the signing of the Eurasian Union 
economic agreement scheduled to come into effect in January. 
This also suggests that absent a resolute reinforcement strategy 
by NATO, Russia will maintain the ability to escalate the crisis, 
including hybrid scenarios in the Baltic region that couldcross 
into NATO’s territory, testing the scope of allied solidarity. 
Another important dimension of the current debate on 
how to reinforce NATO’s northeastern flank is the question of 
whether/how to assist Ukraine’s military to evenout the playing 
field. A  disconnect in NATO’s current approach is the strict 
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separation of reassurance for NATO allies facing Russia, andthe 
West’s refusal to supply Ukraine with urgently needed military 
assistance. An effective deterrent strategy should include the re-
building of a viable Ukrainian military, one capable of raising 
the cost of any future military action by Russia. By not extend-
ing meaningful military assistance to Ukraine – especially an-
ti-tank, anti-air, communications and medical – the West has 
in effect conceded that its response to any further aggression by 
Russia will be reduced to containment along NATO’s periphery. 
The 2014 Newport NATO summit offered a package of meas-
ures for northcentral European allies, which have improved the 
situation and contributed to reassurance along the northeast-
ern flank, but have not fully addressed the continued Russian 
threat. The most important decision made at Newport in that 
regard was the unwillingness to create a permanent U.S. and 
NATO base structure in the Baltic States and Poland. The cur-
rent formula of “persistent rotations” adopted after the NATO 
Walessummitcould convey to Putin’s government that NATO 
may not be determined to stand its ground should Russia begin 
to apply pressure directly – an ambiguity that poses a risk of en-
couraging further escalation from Moscow. The most vulnerable 
are the Baltic states, where Moscow can use its influence with 
Russian ethnics to replay the Crimea and Donbas scenarios. 
The Alliance needs a  strategy to address this challenge on 
two fronts: (1) U.S. leadership in the run-up to the NATO 
summit in Warsaw in 2016 should foster a  consensus on the 
policy that allied solidarity must remain the paramount objec-
tive should Russia begin to probe further into NATO territory; 
and (2) by putting in place a new military strategy that aims to 
establish permanent deployments and tripwires against Russia’s 
attempt to pressure NATO directly. Here one caveat is in order: 
Washington has to engage early in the process if the differences 
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among the allies are to be ironed out. It should be of para-
mount concern to all in NATO that the next summit is not 
a  failed summit, and that a  compromise be found between 
what the Baltic States and Poland expect and what Germany, 
France and Italy are willing to support. It would be damaging 
to the alliance if the debate on strategic reinforcement and 
permanent bases along the northeastern flank were to generate 
more discord and division in NATO, weakening its ability to 
act as an alliance. 
I would recommend that if allies manage to reach consen-
sus on permanent bases as the optimum path to reinforcement, 
to implement it NATO should deploy a heavy brigade combat 
team (BCT) size deployment in Estonia (or divide it among 
the three Baltic States), and at least one (but preferably two) 
BCTs in Poland. These deployments should be a mix of US and 
non-US NATO forces. In order to shore up the South, NATO 
should consider putting another BCT in Romania. The total ac-
tual deployment should be approximately 20,000 of both U.S. 
and non-U.S. NATO personnel. These numbers and the cost 
are manageable and would hardly be a burden to this alliance of 
the wealthiest nations on earth. The deployments would need 
to be drawn from European as well as U.S. forces, especially 
since the U.S. military presence in Europe has been significantly 
reduced. Likewise, the Szczecin HQ in western Poland ought 
to be converted into a  full-blown Eastern Command, led by 
a  general officer from one of the NATO frontier states, with 
a U.S. deputy, and staffed with U.S. and European personnel.1 
This proposal should be tested against theresources that can be 
1 These numbers have been suggested by John Schindler as the mini-
mum to provide credible tripwires in Central Europe and the Baltics. 
At: http://20committee.com/2014/06/03/defending-natos-eastern-fron-
tier-a-modest-proposal.
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generated, theforces available for deployment, and most impor-
tantly the scope of political consensus among the allies. 
There needs to be a new sense of urgency among the allies 
about addressing the key reinforcement issue in anticipation 
of the Warsaw summit. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, 
its seizure of Crimea, and its most recent encroachment into 
Ukraine have upended Europe’s normative security order and 
presented a direct challenge to NATO’s collective security prin-
ciple.The Alliance has an important choice to make: either use 
the deliverables from Wales as a  steppingstone to build a  ro-
bust deterrent posture basedon a permanent troop and asset de-
ployment along the frontier, or continue to see its own viability 
questioned still further if/when Russia decides to probe again 
to expose the lack of Western resolve, only this time most likely 
against a NATO ally. 
The political context for implementing such an approach 
to deterrence along NATO’s northeastern flank is there, espe-
cially if one considers President Obama’s statements in Warsaw 
and Tallinn, statements by some European political leaders and 
of late by the new NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg. The 
greatest obstacle remains outright opposition to the permanent 
stationing of NATO troops in the region, most notably those 
articulated publicly in Berlin, but also shared by a number of 
Western European capitals where a “buyer’s remorse” of sorts on 
NATO enlargement seems to have settled in. 
One outstanding issue that continues to bedevil NATO’s ef-
forts to shift from reassurance to deterrence is the continued 
decline in defense spending in most European member states. 
The question of Europe’s overall unwillingness to step up to the 
plate on defense expenditures has been raised repeatedly with 
little overall success by U.S. politicians, analysts (this one in-
cluded), and the media. The simple reality is that doing more 
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with less has never been a viable approach, and that an effort to 
reinforce the flank and increase the overall readiness level of the 
alliance requires money. Today the United States provides 70 
percent of NATO defense spending – a situation that is polit-
ically unsustainable and, frankly, not conducive to intra-allied 
cooperation. We are at a point where the lack of investment in 
the military hasbecome a fundamental limitation on what NA-
TO’s European allies will be able to do with the United States, 
and hence how European security concerns are likely to register 
in Washington. The accelerated exercise tempo and the estab-
lishment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) 
are all welcome developments, but the United States urgently 
needs NATO to develop and to fund a new playbook, not just 
for Europe but for other areas of the world where security con-
ditions will likely continue to deteriorate. If Europe wants to 
have a credible security guarantee from the United States, in re-
turn it must accept its fair share of the cost. That means making 
the principle of mutuality the centerpiece of its strategy going 
forward, especially as the allies ready for the Warsaw summit, 
so as to ensure that threats will never become regional preoc-
cupations, but rather will generate a response from the alliance 
as a whole. That means Europe needs to make a  significantly 
higher investment in defense, without which it will never field 
the new capabilities it needs to work with the United States 
going forward. If Europe continues to ignore this defense in-
vestment requirement, it will continue to put in question NA-
TO’s credibility and, ultimately, its ability to deter and defend 
in a crisis and to reach consensus on moving from reassurance 
to reinforcement.
The agenda for the Warsaw NATO summit should be to-
make it a priority to deliver reinforcement along the northeast-
ern flank. Unless there is a course correction to move from per-
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sistent rotations to permanent presence, the current trajectory 
will embolden Russia further to exert more pressure along the 
NATO periphery. The results of Wales have been an encour-
aging step in the right direction; however, it is time to move 
from the focus on de-escalation to that of deterrence. Efforts to 
seek political accommodation and compromise, i.e., to freeze 
the conflict, are important to maintain consensus within the al-
liance but they should not substitute for steps that clearly com-
municate NATO’s commitment to deterrence and territorial 
defense. 

Bogdan Klich
NATO and the EU CSDP  
– credibility and revitalisation
In recent years we have witnessed significant changes in Eu-
rope’s eastern and southern neighbourhood, which have had 
a profoundly negative impact on our security. The threat from 
the East, whose nature could be described as traditional or con-
ventional, stems from the aggressive posture of Russia. The il-
legal annexation of Crimea and the armed intervention in the 
eastern provinces of Ukraine constitute an assault on the post-
Cold War international order. In addition, Moscow’s efforts to 
regain control over countries that once belonged to the Soviet 
Union are a direct danger to the security of some NATO and 
EU member states. Meanwhile, the threat from the South is 
asymmetrical. Jihadist organisations obviously cannot directly 
challenge the West militarily, but they can deal painful blows 
through terrorist attacks on European soil or disruption of ener-
gy supply. We are arguably better prepared to deal with this kind 
of threat as it has been present since 9/11. Currently, however, 
the scale of the danger seems much larger and likely to grow. 
The area of instability in the Middle East and North Africa, 
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which is a breeding ground for terrorism, continues to enlarge, 
while the recent attack in Tunisia is a painful reminder that even 
in countries considered as relatively stable the political transi-
tion is extremely fragile. 
These threats constitute an unprecedented challenge to 
which democratic Europe has to respond both as a  group of 
NATO allies and through the CSDP framework.
NATO’s reaction to Russia’s aggressive posture was correct. 
It is a reaction that fortifies the credibility of Article 5 and con-
siderably strengthens the feeling of security among Central Eu-
ropean members of the Alliance. The Readiness Action Plan ap-
proved at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014 is being put into 
practice. A series of military exercises was carried out in 2014 
and 2015 in the countries that constitute the Alliance’s east-
ern flank, the major ones with participation of several thousand 
troops. Back in 2009, when, following the Russian attack on 
Georgia – along with my counterparts from Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania – I requested a military exercise on the eastern flank, 
some allies questioned the necessity of such an undertaking. It 
took several years before the Steadfast Jazz exercise finally took 
place. Today the importance of military exercises on our eastern 
flank is beyond doubt. 
Adaptation measures are being implemented as well. The 
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, also known as the “Spear-
head Force”, saw its first action during the Noble Jump exercise 
in Poland in June 2015. The US Defence Secretary announced 
recently that, in accordance with the commitments made in 
Wales, the US will preposition 250 tanks, artillery and other 
equipment in the Baltic states, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. 
Furthermore, defence plans for the eastern flank will be up-
dated. If we compare the current situation with the somewhat 
lukewarm reaction to the request for contingency plans, for-
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mulated by the defence ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland in 2008, the contrast is striking. The assessment of 
the situation on NATO’s eastern border has manifestly evolved 
considerably – and rightly so. The measures mentioned above 
clearly demonstrate that NATO Allies not only recognise the 
shifts in our strategic environment, but also take actions to pre-
pare to face the possible consequences of these shifts. 
In view of the upcoming NATO Summit in Warsaw, it 
should be stressed that a successful implementation of the Read-
iness Action Plan – however important – is not enough. The 
meeting in Warsaw cannot be just a stock-taking summit, but 
should chart a way forward too. Three suggestions can be made 
in this respect:
– The time has come to consider changing the temporary de-
ployment of NATO troops on the Alliance’s eastern flank 
into a permanent one. Given the blatant breeches of inter-
national law by Russia, NATO’s declaration to refrain from 
“permanent stationing of substantial combat forces” in this 
area, in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations between 
NATO and the Russian Federation, must be seen as void.
– Efforts to maintain a high degree of interoperability of our 
forces have to continue. Cooperation in the challenging 
conditions of the operation in Afghanistan has led to im-
proved interoperability and we should strive to keep it this 
way. The Warsaw summit should craft an appropriate for-
mula for continuing the work on interoperability through 
multinational exercises. 
– A closer cooperation with partners is needed, and in particu-
lar with countries such as Sweden and Finland for whom the 
resurgence of revisionist and militaristic Russia is an impor-
tant threat. Whether these countries will decide to join the 
Alliance will depend on their citizens. Yet the example of 
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the important Swedish contribution to the Unified Protector 
operation in Libya demonstrates that there is room for closer 
cooperation. 
The EU Common Security and Defence Policy is another 
vehicle of European power. It is, however, a  vehicle in need 
of repair as we are dealing with the second CSDP crisis. The 
first one – provoked by the divergences between member states 
around the operation in Iraq in 2003 – was relatively swiftly 
overcome. In late 2003 the first European Security Strategy was 
adopted; the first significant CSDP mission – EUFOR-Althea – 
followed in 2004. The establishment of the European Defence 
Agency enhanced cooperation between member states around 
capability planning and development. These developments put 
the CSDP back on track. 
The current CSDP crisis is more complex with both political 
and institutional causes. It seems that apart from provoking cuts 
in the defence budgets of member states, the economic crisis has 
also blunted their determination to build a  common security 
policy. There are worrying signs that the CSDP is stagnating 
and remains far from reaching its full potential. An overview 
of recent political crises in the neighbourhood demonstrates 
that the EU is either too slow to act, paralysed by lengthy and 
complicated procedures, side-lined by member states or content 
with half-measures. In negotiations around the Russian aggres-
sion towards Ukraine the EU High Representative plays second 
fiddle to Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande. The re-
cently launched operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR 
Med) provides a  clear example of an action that focuses on 
symptoms rather than root causes of the problem – a worrying-
ly frequent flaw of EU undertakings. To make matters worse, 
useful instruments established by the Lisbon Treaty, such as the 
29NATO and the EU CSDP – credibility and revitalisation
Permanent Structured Cooperation and Battle Groups, have 
not been properly used. Other mechanisms, such as Pooling and 
Sharing, have underperformed. As a result the European Union 
is punching below its weight. Given the still impressive means – 
both hard and soft – at its disposal, the EU’s inability to shape 
the situation in its neighbourhood is striking. It is difficult to 
imagine that today the EU could launch a more ambitious and 
complex CSDP operation than the one in Mali – small, with 
a limited mandate, and started only in the wake of an interven-
tion by one of the member states. I fear that this situation may 
persist. CSDP missions will remain limited in scope and ambi-
tion, and launched in a reactive manner, following a solo effort 
by a member state or a coalition of the willing. 
The 2013 European Council summit, which was expected to 
provide an impulse for a renewal of the CSDP, did not live up 
to expectations. European leaders failed to tackle the most fun-
damental question of a long-term strategic vision of the CSDP. 
Without the strategic approach the EU will not be effective in 
its neighbourhood, not to mention world affairs. This assertion 
is true today more than ever before as in the global arena we 
have been observing the continuous rise of actors whose policy 
is clearly guided by a sound strategic outlook. In addition, the 
call for a more effective CSDP, expressed by the Council, has 
not been followed by actions that would translate words into 
deeds. 
The outcome of the June 2015 European Council was also 
somewhat disappointing as heads of state and government for-
mulated conclusions that were certainly very sensible, but also 
very general. We cannot but applaud the emphasis on the neces-
sity to create new comprehensive strategies for internal security 
and for foreign and security policy. The latter, in particular, is 
long overdue and could provide the necessary strategic direction 
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for the CSDP. Yet even the most insightful and novel docu-
ments will not make up for political deficits.
An effective CSDP will demand adequate civilian and mil-
itary capabilities. It is therefore reassuring to see the European 
Council call for a  sufficient level of military expenditure and 
greater cooperation on capability development. The preparatory 
action on CSDP-related research that is currently taking shape 
is a promising initiative that could pave the way for the greater 
cooperation of a large number of stakeholders (scientists, indus-
try and MoDs) around defence-related technologies. 
Finally, smooth cooperation between the EU and NATO 
should remain a top priority. It is an area where more can cer-
tainly be achieved. It seems that a new agreement, which could 
be dubbed an “enhanced Berlin Plus agreement”, is needed. It 
could include such issues as the relationship between the Allied 
Command Transformation in Norfolk and the EDA. Its pur-
pose would be to provide a legal framework for those aspects of 
the relationship that are currently functioning on the basis of 
a political understanding: it would thus constitute an insurance 
policy, should this understanding start to fade. 
In conclusion, it is important to emphasise that today NATO 
is better prepared than the EU to tackle the threats in the East 
and the South. What both organisations need from Europe is 
the political will to deal with the current challenges, more gen-
erous funding and a  continuous commitment to developing 
cutting-edge capabilities. NATO should transform temporary 
measures supporting Article 5 into permanent ones, while the 
EU has to revitalise the CSDP, and thus regain credibility as an 
international actor.
Rob de Wijk
NATO’s deterrent potential: 
A sufficient guarantee of security?1
Is NATO’s deterrent potential a sufficient guarantee of securi-
ty? The obvious answer is negative. The implication of this is 
that we should invest in our armed forces, including the nuclear 
forces of the US, the UK and France as a back up to the EU’s 
soft power. This contribution looks at hard and soft power and 
explains what went wrong in our relationship with Russia. 
Hard power 
Hard power consists of military capabilities, a strong economy 
and the political will to use them to coerce. The European Un-
ion, however, is not a credible military power. According to SI-
PRI, in 2014 European military spending increased by 0.6 per 
cent, reaching $ 386 billion. In Eastern Europe spending was 
up 8.4 per cent, while in Western and Central Europe spending 
 
1 The original speech and this contribution is based on a chapter written 
for a Fit for the Future study on the geopolitics of the European Union of 
the Leiden University. 
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was down 1.9 per cent. From 2005 – 2014 spending decreased 
by 8.3 per cent.2
Despite the increase of Russian defense spending by 8.1 per 
cent, the downward trend in Western Europehas continued. 
On the other hand Poland increased its defense budget by 13 
per cent. Due to the perception of the increased Russian threat, 
by 2015 Central and Eastern European member states had in-
creased their budgets, while Western Europe showed little will-
ingness to follow suit.
Unsurprisingly (despite the assurances of successive U.S. 
Presidents) there has been a widespread belief that the American 
security guarantee is not credible. This could have serious impli-
cations for countries such as Estonia. The eastern city of Narva 
is dominated by a  Russian speaking majority thatfavored the 
annexation of Crimea. What would happen if Russia started to 
support Russian speaking rebels in the city, and ultimately car-
ry out an intervention on their behalf? Technically, this would 
trigger Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which stipulates that an 
attack on one member state is an attack on all member states. 
In reality it was uncertain whether the Americans would help 
the Estonians out. Moreover, weak EU solidarity led to fears 
the EU would be unable to respond firmly. Obama’s pledge in 
2014 of a reassurance fund of one billion U.S. dollars to help 
Central and Eastern European countries improve their defenses 
alleviated these concerns.
Why are Europeans so reluctant to spend more on defense? 
The answer is our political and strategic culture. Certainly, Rus-
sia’s annexation of the Crimea and its Ukraine policies were 
driven by revanchist, anti-western ideas caused by German 
 
2 SIPRI Fact Sheet, Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2014, p. 4. At: 
http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1504.pdf.
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reunification, subsequent NATO and EU enlargement, the war 
on Kosovo, and other “illegal” interventions.
The Ukraine crisis would probably not have happened if the 
European Union had not neglected its armed forces when the 
EU was politically more united, and more importantly if Eu-
rope understood how to coerce and play power politics.
Most importantly, it was not NATO but the European Un-
ion’s Association Agreements that got Europe involved in its 
biggest crisis for decades. Indeed, the Association Agreements 
reveal that most politicians do not appreciate that soft power is 
a powerful geopolitical instrument.
Most leaders are unaware that Russian leaders considered the 
EU’s integration, enlargement and neighborhood policies to be 
highly successful and threatening geopolitical projects. European 
leaders stress the Union’s open door policies, but Russian leaders 
argue these policies interfere in Russia’s sphere of influence, and 
prevent the establishment of effective Russian-led multinational 
organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Union.
This explains why the planned EU Association Agreement 
with Ukraine sparked a major crisis in Europe. Moreover, to Eu-
ropean political leaders and their constituencies, who consider 
enlargement as a process contributing to peace and stability, the 
Ukraine crisis came as a shock.
Despite the absence of formal geopolitical thinking and 
the rejection of traditional power politics, soft power and the 
assertive use of trade policies turned the Union into a geopo-
litical player and even provoked a  major international crisis. 
But because European political leaders and their constituencies 
considered enlargement as a process contributing to peace and 
stability, the Ukraine crisis not only came as a shock but puts 
Europe’s distinct model of international conduct that emerged 
following the end of the Cold War in jeopardy. This is what hap-
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pens if one does not take the perceptions and interests of adver-
saries into account. This also explains how soft power gains can 
be lost if one neglects hard power. In other words, hard power 
and soft power are two sides of the same coin.
Nevertheless, Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and its in-
volvement in Eastern Ukraine triggered an EU response of co-
ercive diplomacy. Political leaders had forgotten that hard and 
soft power go hand in hand. Moreover, they had forgotten that 
deterrence based on credible conventional and nuclear force is 
essential to consolidate the gains of soft power. 
Soft power
Joseph Nye of Harvard University developed the concept of soft 
power.3 His concept describes the ability to attract and co-opt 
rather than coerce, use force or give money as a means of per-
suasion. Soft power is based on the attraction of the EU as a role 
model and a beacon of stability and prosperity.
As countries could only join on a voluntary basis and had to 
make great efforts to become members, the EU’s integration, 
enlargement, and neighborhood policies are the most visible ex-
pressions of soft power. These policies are based on the idea that 
an ever-expanding Union contributes to a zone of stability. It 
is believed that this enlargement is threatening no one because 
countries join on a voluntary basis.
What explains the EU’s and NATO Europe’s reliance on 
soft power, the rejection of geopolitics and the reluctance to use 
hard power instruments?
The first explanation is the Union’s post-modern political 
culture. Post-modernity is a consequence of the integration pro-
3 Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 
pp. 81–109. 
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cess that started in the 1950s. The British diplomat and strate-
gist Robert Cooper observes that this system has some funda-
mental characteristics: 
– Mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs. As a re-
sult, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs be-
came blurred, borders became irrelevant, and the concept of 
sovereignty weakened; 
– The obsolescence of force as an instrument for resolving 
disputes. Self-imposed rules of behavior were codified and 
monitored;
– Security had become based on transparency, mutual open-
ness, interdependency, and mutual vulnerability.4
The obsolescence of the use of force within the post-modern 
system explains Europe’s risk aversion.
A Win/Gallup poll found that few Europeans are willing 
to fight for their nation: “Globally, 60 per cent said that they 
would be willing to take up arms for their country, while 27 per-
cent would not be willing. Western Europe proved the region 
most reticent to fighting for their country, with just 25 per cent 
saying that they would fight while about half (53 per cent) stat-
ed that they would not fight for their flag”.5 Only 18 per cent 
of the Germans, 27 per cent of the Brits and 29 per cent of the 
French said that they would defend their country.6
Over recent decades the EU has developed mechanisms for 
conflict management. Growing interdependency explains the 
preference for the multinational approach. The resulting mul-
tilateral system rendered the use of force among the member 
states obsolete. Consequently, the concept of territorial security 
4 R. Cooper, The new liberal imperialism, The Observer, 7 April 2002.
5 Win/Gallup International End of the Year Survey 2014. At: http://www.
wingia.com/en/services/end_of_year_survey_2014/8.
6 Ibid.
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was replaced by the concept of human security. It comes as no 
surprise that the EU member states consider soft power more 
important than hard power.
The second explanation is that by definition the EU is divid-
ed on many fundamental issues.
First, the EU is about negotiation and the production of con-
sensus. As the Union consists of 28 member states with different 
historical backgrounds, strategic and political cultures and con-
sequently foreign policy preferences, reaching consensus on the 
use of force is difficult.
Second, the member states differ about the purpose and role 
of the EU and NATO. All member states accept the EU as 
a  free trade zone. But when it comes to the EU’s role in the 
world stark differences are visible. Regarding power politics 
and the use of force, former colonial powers and trade nations 
such as the United Kingdom and France are most outspoken. 
For example, both countries took the initiative to carry out an 
intervention in Libya in 2011. But in contrast to the United 
Kingdom, France has always argued in favor of European de-
fense efforts instead of the American led transatlantic alliance. 
Other member states, such as Germany, have sworn off the use 
of military force and become truly postmodern. Member states 
in Eastern Europe feared a  revanchist Russia and are more 
interested in NATO than in the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). Other countries, including the Neth-
erlands, traditionally tried to balance the major continental 
powers. While rejecting the use of force, they relied for their 
security mainly on the Transatlantic relationship and conse-
quently on NATO. Finally, the ongoing controversy between 
EU and NATO member Greece and NATO member Turkey 
over Cyprus prevented an effective CFSP. In 2002, NATO and 
the EU agreed in Berlin that NATO would facilitate European 
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operations with headquarters and collective NATO assets such 
as AWACS radar aircraft. As this would have the consent of all 
NATO member states, Turkey could effectively block the use 
of those assets.
Differences became visible in 2003 during the US-led inva-
sion of Iraq. The intervention forced the member states to de-
velop a common strategic vision to enhance internal cohesion. 
The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, Javier Solana, was tasked to draft a European Security 
Strategy (ESS), which was adopted by the European Council on 
12-13 December 2003.7
The purpose of the document was to provide the concep-
tual framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), and the subsequent Common Security and Defense 
Policy (CSDP). But the resulting document did not stress the 
importance of geopolitics and the use of force. Instead the strat-
egy stated: “Drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU 
already contributes to a  more secure world. We have worked 
to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, 
promoting good governance and human rights, assisting devel-
opment, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecu-
rity. The EU remains the biggest donor to countries in need. 
Long-term engagement is required for lasting stabilization”.8 
The prevailing view in those days was that the EU was a “force 
for good.” There was also a broad consensus that the EU should 
not enter the world stage as a geopolitical player.
The final explanation why the EU relies on soft power and 
rejects geopolitics is the existence of a number of fault lines:
7 European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brus-
sels, 12 December 2003. At: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cmsupload/78367.pdf.
8 Ibid.
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First, the sovereign debt crisis revealed differences between 
Northern and Southern members about fiscal discipline. North-
ern member states stressed fiscal prudence and austerity; South-
ern member states proposed additional spending to resolve the 
crisis. As a result constituencies in the north feared the Union 
would become a transfer union, where the north subsidizes the 
“reckless” fiscal policies of the south. Thus, the financial crisis 
has weakened solidarity between the Northern and Southern 
member states.
Second, for Eastern and Central European member states de-
fense against Russia is priority number one. Western European 
member states stress the defense of their (trade) interests abroad, 
whilst Southern European member states focus on instability in 
the Middle East and the Maghreb.
Third, due to the financial crisis some member states are 
more receptive to Russian and Chinese proposals for solving 
their problems. Southern European member states have a much 
more liberal attitude towards Russia and China, and are more 
supportive than Northern member states.9
The Russian government used its State Owned Enterprises 
(SOE) and its Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) to “buy” in-
fluence in member states in the south. Gazprom’s South Stream 
pipeline was, primarily, a geopolitical project for fostering closer 
ties with countries such as Hungary, Austria and Greece. The 
EU and the U.S. responded with sanctions against Russia. By 
terminating South Stream, and denying concessions for gas ex-
plorations in the North Sea, the EU weakened Gazprom as a ge-
opolitical player.
After entering office the Greek Prime Minister Aleksis Tsip-
ras called on the Union to end its sanctions against Russia. Dur-
9 John Fox and Francois Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations 
(London: European Council of Foreign Affairs, 2009), p. 4.
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ing a visit to Moscow he warned that they could lead to a “new 
cold war”. A number of political parties, such as the Front Na-
tional in France, accepted donations or loans from Russia. Con-
sequently, parts of the electorates became more sympathetic to-
wards Russia. Some governmental leaders, such as VictorOrban, 
the Prime Minister of Hungary, argued that the financial crisis 
which started in 2008 proved the superiority of the Chinese 
”model” over the West’s neo-liberal, capitalistic system. This 
suggests that as China’s wealth grows, Beijing’s soft power could 
even replace that of the U.S. and Europe’s.
Fourth, in most member states nationalism and protection-
ism are on the rise. The resulting fragmentation of domestic 
politics makes member states inward-looking. In addition, the 
risk of civil unrest and even the break-up of member states are 
likely.
Fifth, the economic crisis affected themember states of the 
EU and NATO and reduced their willingness to project hard 
power. However, due to the Ukraine crisis, the rise of China, 
the acknowledgement that energy and raw materials are now 
the subject of geopolitical strife, and the need to protect com-
mon values and interests, in 2015 the subject of the actual use 
of force is attracting more attention. Member states such as the 
United Kingdom and France are more willing to project power 
that others.
Finally, the refugee crisis of 2015 reveals stark differences be-
tween “old” and “new” members. Whereas Germany and oth-
er West European states felt obliged to accommodate refugees, 
member states such as Hungary built fences to prevent refugees 
from entering the country. This has led to accusations by West 
European member states that they accepted newcomers in the 
EU after the end of the Cold War, and that these “new” member 
states are now expected to take a fair share of the burden.
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What went wrong? 
According to the EU Treaties, membership is open to any Eu-
ropean state which respects values including “respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and re-
spect for human rights, including the rights of persons belong-
ing to minorities”.
After the end of the Cold War most former member states of 
the Warsaw Pact became members of the EU. For those coun-
tries not able to join the Union the European Neighbourhood 
Policy was developed, consisting of four elements. The first el-
ement is Cross Border Cooperation (CBC), which supports sus-
tainable development along the EU’s external borders. The aims 
of CBC are the promotion of economic and social development 
in border areas; addressing common challenges; and putting in 
place better conditions for the mobility of persons, goods and 
capital.
The second element is Neighbourhood Wide Cooperation. 
Most EU assistance is channeled through bilateral and region-
al cooperation programs. However, some aid activities can be 
managed more effectively at interregional level. This applies for 
example to activities implemented by international organiza-
tions.
The third element is called the Southern Neighbourhood 
Policy, which targets Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. Among other things, co-
operation covers sectors such as economic and democratic de-
velopment and social issues, including social protection, human 
development and migration.
The final element is the Eastern Partnership with former So-
viet Republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine. Engagement with civil society is a new element 
of the Eastern Partnership. Track one of the Eastern Partner-
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ship is the bilateral dimension to the support of political and 
socio-economic reform. The main aim is to foster political as-
sociation and economic integration with the EU. Track two is 
multinational cooperation, which addresses common challenges 
and transboundary issues such as energy, transport and the en-
vironment. The Eastern Partnership with individual countries is 
codified in so called Association Agreements.
The Partnership was initiated by Poland’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Radek Sikorski, co-drafted by Sweden, and presented 
by the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the EU’s Gen-
eral Affairs and External Relations Council on 26 May 2009. 
Russia feared that with the Eastern Partnership the EU was try-
ing to establish a new sphere of influence. This was not entire-
ly unfounded. While the draft Summit declaration stated that: 
“Shared values including democracy, the rule of law, and respect 
for human rights will be at its core, as well as the principles 
of market economy, sustainable development and good govern-
ance,” it also noted that the region is of “strategic importance” 
and that the EU has an “interest in developing an increasingly 
close relationship with its Eastern partners, Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.”10 
By including the last European dictatorship Belarus, it was clear 
that geopolitical intentions played a role. Indeed, the EU feared 
that Moscow would strengthen its grip on Minsk if Belarus was 
left out. But the EU rejected the notion of a new sphere of in-
fluence because the countries themselves opted to join.
Undoubtedly, Article 7.1 of the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement has added to Russia’s worries that the EU was ex-
panding its sphere of influence: “The Parties shall intensify their 
dialogue and cooperation and promote gradual convergence in 
10 Values to form Core of Association Agreements, EU Observer, 18 March 
2009. At: https://euobserver.com/foreign/27799.
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the area of foreign and security policy, including the Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and shall address in par-
ticular issues of conflict prevention and crisis management, re-
gional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control 
and arms export control as well as enhanced mutually-beneficial 
dialogue in the field of space.”11
Both enlargement and Neighbourhood Policies are soft pow-
er initiatives. No country is forced to join any of these initia-
tives. But the attraction of a  powerful, wealthy bloc was suf-
ficient reason to join. Consequently, Russia considered both 
initiatives as attempts to enlarge the West’s sphere of influence. 
Russia considered this a humiliation, and an attempt to exploit 
the weakness of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
But it was the Association Agreement that caused the Ukraine 
crisis in 2014.
As the agreement was designed for countries belonging to 
the former Soviet space there were clear geopolitical objectives 
as well:
First, integration will lead to political independencies. This 
will support the liberal peace hypothesis, which maintains that 
economic integration agreements institutionalize dependen-
cies, which generate higher costs for mutual conflicts and foster 
peace.
Second, by focusing on the former Soviet sphere, it weak-
ens Russia by making it more difficult to establish the Eur-
asian Economic Union. The Eurasian Economic Union was 
established on 29 May 2014 by the leaders of Belarus, Ka-
zakhstan and Russia, and came into force on 1 January 2015. 
Armenia’s accession treaty came into force on 2 January 2015. 
Treaties aiming for the accession of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan 
11 Full text of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement at: http://eeas.euro-
pa.eu/ukraine/docs/association_agreement_ukraine_2014_en.pdf.
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were signed on 9 October 2014 and 23 December 2014. Ar-
menia became an EEU member state on 2 January 2015 and 
Kyrgyzstan joined the Union on 6 August 2015. All member 
states participate in the Collective Security Treaty Organiza-
tion. Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan established this mutual defense alliance to-
gether with the Commonwealth of Independent States after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, the Eurasian Union, 
as a geopolitical project, was a natural extension of the latter 
institutions and a geopolitical project in its own right. Unsur-
prisingly, Russia considered the Eastern Partnership and the 
resulting Association Agreements as interference in its sphere 
of influence.
Over time the EU developed a number of foreign policy in-
struments. The traditional instruments are diplomacy and oper-
ational engagement. Diplomacy consists of declarations of the 
High Representative for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 
and of course visits and statements by the President of the Euro-
pean Council and the President of the European Commission. 
Operational engagement is civilian and military operations, EU 
assistance, sanctions and trade policies. As will be seen, during 
the Ukraine crisis trade policies were used for coercive diploma-
cy. As its shaping power weakens, Europe will find it increasing-
ly difficult to protect its global interests. 
The future
First, the EU and NATO need a coherent new geopolitical vi-
sion in which they accept the new global geopolitical realities. 
I made this argument during the last discussions on the Alliance 
Strategic Concept, but there was no inclination whatsoever to 
discuss power shifts and a multipolar world. A multipolar world 
is a fragmented global order. Such a system is less stable than the 
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world we know today. The heightened risk of misperceptions in 
a multipolar world undermines trust and stability.
An unanticipated consequence of the Ukraine crisis is that 
Russia actively seeks to foster new partnerships with BRICS 
countries and more aggressively pushes its Eurasian Economic 
Union. Erik Jones and Andrew Witworth write that “if eco-
nomic interdependence with Europe and the United States 
comes to be seen as a diplomatic vulnerability, governments in 
Russia and countries that might one day face sanctions have an 
interest in looking for alternate arrangements that are less easily 
exploited”.12
Second, the Realist School predicts that if faced with a com-
mon challenge countries are willing to work together. This is 
what Russia is trying to do. As Europe and the U.S. share 
the same historical, cultural and religious roots the two could 
form a powerful economic and consequently political block. 
An important development is the Transatlantic Trade and In-
vestment Partnership (TTIP). The TTIP is a free trade agree-
ment between the EU and the United States, which should re-
sult in approximately 0.5 per cent economic growth in Europe 
and America. Started as a project to boost the economy, the 
TTIP has increasingly become a  geopolitical project to bal-
ance China. The Americans consider TTIP as a companion for 
the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is also a regional 
regulatory and investment treaty. Since 2014, twelve countries 
throughout the Asia-Pacific region have participated in nego-
tiations on the TPP: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United 
States, and Vietnam.
12 Erik Jones and Andrew Witworth, The Unintended Consequences of 
European Sanctions on Russia, Survival, 2014, 56(5), p. 22.
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Third, leaders need to realize that effective deterrence requires 
credible force and the political will to use it. As the new world 
will be more dangerous, power politics and the use of force will 
figure more prominently on the agenda of EU politicians. In-
deed, the Ukraine crisis triggered a debate on strengthening Eu-
rope’s defenses. The constant maneuvers of China in the South 
China Sea reached a new height in 2015. Even in Europe this 
caused considerable uneasiness and the realization that global 
power shifts emphasized the importance of military force.
If political leaders are unable to take the new geopolitical 
challenges into account, the EU and NATO could collapse and 
Europe as a whole could sink into oblivion.

Sten Tolgfors
NATO’s deterrence  
and the predictability deficit
The days of Russian co-operation are over
Russia has made an exit from the rules-based order of inter-state 
relations, an order which is absolutely fundamental to our coun-
tries, and solidly based on the OSCE and UN charters.
The West must reject reborn notions of “zones of influence”, 
and the idea that the political interests of a large country should 
be considered before the integrity of smaller states. 
A structural deficit of predictability
Russia does its best to conceal the intent, aim, means and pur-
pose of its actions. By keeping the Western world guessing, Rus-
sia is increasing the leverage of its actions. By having us won-
dering, sometimes anxiously, about what the next move will be, 
Russia gains in relative strength.
By not defining a preferred end state, or even what the initial 
problem is, Russia makes it harder for the West to draw the 
line, and determine when the time has come to show additional 
resolve.
48 Sten Tolgfors
The present state, a  kind of a  structural deficit of predict-
ability, is dangerous. Even during the Cold War, the necessity 
of being capable of predicting the opponent’s strategy was rec-
ognized. Current large scale, unannounced or incorrectly an-
nounced, exercises can cover Russia’s level of readiness up and 
reduce preparation time for military action.
This predictability deficit means that an accident or incident 
would be harder to handle today than it was previously. The 
level of risk is highly increased by uncertainty and well-justified 
distrust.
Russia is operating at present with a  high level of risk. If 
you fly within meters of another country’s military aircraft, or 
a couple of hundred feet from a civilian air liner with your tran-
sponder turned off, there are significant risks involved. We see 
a pattern in Russian behavior – in the Baltic Sea Area, but also 
outside the coastal areas of Britain, Portugal, the US, and Japan.
All of this produces massive media attention, thus putting 
stress on our political systems. In short, we are being played. It’s 
done with a purpose. Even our focus on the actions of Russia is 
perhaps sometimes in line with their interests; but, of course, it 
cannot and should not be avoided. 
Non-existent Russian soft power
The unacceptable use of force of the kind we saw in Georgia and 
see in the Ukraine will probably not be the last examples of the 
Russian use of military force. The present situation in and on 
the border with Ukraine is very concerning.
To Russia security and power – domestically and interna-
tionally – are zero-sum games. The Kremlin wants to establish 
a  Russian zone of influence in the self-defined near abroad, 
which they can’t do by using soft power. To most, there is little 
to no attraction in close co-operation or integration with Russia.
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Power is in Russian eyes relative – if you gain, we lose. If 
Russia brings an economic cost on itself for its action in the 
Ukraine, it might still be considered worth it, given that a great-
er goal is still achieved, especially one such as keeping Nato out 
of Ukraine.
Once the path of confrontation is chosen, it is hard to turn 
away from it without losing face. Many conclude that Russian 
foreign policy is driven by internal needs, and is important for 
the domestic legitimacy of the Kremlin. 
The challenge to the European security order 
It is only too likely that Moscow considers it to be in the Rus-
sian interest to further challenge the stability of the European 
security order, which is ultimately guaranteed by the US via 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Article 5 is not only fundamental to the security of Europe 
– which is one reason Sweden in my view should join NATO 
– but also fundamental for American interests. Should the cred-
ibility of Article 5 be successfully challenged, or even appear to 
be challenged, then this would have an overwhelming effect on 
American influence in the global arena, not only in Europe but 
also in the Asia/Pacific region.
Therefore, it is of course in America’s own interest to stand 
firm behind the heart of Nato, Article 5.
The challenge to Article 5 
What then could be Russia’s intentions? Russia is challenging 
both the geographical scope of Article 5, as well as the type and 
level of threats to which Article 5 is applicable.
We have already seen examples of how the geographical scope 
of Article 5 has been challenged. When an Estonian officer was 
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kidnapped inside Estonia, and brought to Moscow, this signaled 
a lack of respect for the border, and a wish to demonstrate that 
NATO is not fully protecting it. The incident occurred right af-
ter President Obama visited Estonia, which only underlined the 
nerve of the action. The security guarantee had been reiterated 
during his visit.
We have also seen questions about what kind of threats 
Article 5 actually is applicable to. How grave – and perhaps 
how militarily conventional – must a threat be to supersede the 
threshold for measures of common defense?
Russian 6th generation warfare seems to be based on the re-
alization that a war is not always perceived as a war until it is 
manifested by heavy fighting between conventional units.
Much of hybrid warfare seems designed to undershoot the 
traditional threshold of Article 5, and to delay countermeas-
ures by an opponent’s allies and friends. Nato and the US must, 
in light of hybrid warfare, clearly illustrate that any and every 
threat to any member’s stability, integrity and security will be 
considered to be of common interest, and result in appropriate 
common action.
The support and instigation of internal unrest and ethnic dif-
ficulties, information operations, destabilization of political sys-
tems and their key actors, the use of “little green men”, masked 
and unmarked special-forces, support of what are claimed to 
be local resistance or rebellious forces, all combined with the 
constant denial of foreign involvement, are measures designed 
to stall and avoid the reactions of the outside world.
First, control over territory could be gained, or at least the 
legitimate state authority could be reestablished. Then, con-
ventional forces could be brought in to hold the ground. They 
would preferably not be visibly risked until control is already 
achieved. Russia would, surely, want the geographical scope of 
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Article 5 to be questioned or withdrawn from the Baltic States, 
and the type of threats to which it is applicable to be limited to 
conventional military conflicts.
Nato should continuously mark the opposite. Allied pres-
ence on the ground is important, as is the ongoing air operation 
in the Baltic States.
Tactical nuclear warheads 
Russia is trying to increase the perceived price of Western ac-
tion, again to water down Article 5. It is no coincidence that 
Russian officials repeatedly talk about Russia’s nuclear capabili-
ty. In this sense, we should probably worry more about tactical 
warheads than Russia’s strategic capabilities.
Their tactical warheads are numerous; they are spread out 
geographically and there might be a risk that the threshold for 
their use is lower than presumed. A risk lies in possible political 
extortion. The underlying message would be, if the West acts 
to defend an Eastern European nation it must be prepared for 
a nuclear reaction. One should, however, recognize that even 
Western fear of this would be in Russia’s interest. The message is 
designed to plant questions within Nato – are you prepared to 
lose a city or thousands of deployed soldiers to defend an ally? 
So again, the Russian action is aimed at the heart of Nato, the 
credibility of Article 5.
The doctrines of Nato and its Member States with nuclear 
capabilities perhaps need to be refreshed and articulated. The 
bottom line is that Article 5 must stand.
The Russian objective to affect the security policy of Europe 
Russia is trying to intimidate several countries in Europe, by 
violating their air space, borders and generally by acting reck-
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lessly. The Russian motive is to affect the security policy of the 
countries concerned.
It is clear that one Russian goal is to prevent US influence 
in general, and specifically NATO enlargement. But all nations 
have the solemn right and obligation to determine their own 
security policy.
It is crucial that NATO remains open for enlargement and 
important that some partner countries – such as Sweden – apply 
for membership of it. A push towards the spliting and division 
of the West should result in the opposite, a more united West. 
Russian attempts to replace Europe’s united approach to for-
eign policy through CFSP, with select bilateral co-operation, 
must be rejected. Relations must not be bi-lateralized.
Russia is clearly conventionally weaker than the West. Rus-
sia´s defense spending is about 1/7 of US defense spending. But 
Russia has shown a readiness to use its growing military capabil-
ity against smaller neighbors. The fact that the Russian econo-
my is plunging should not put us at ease. When countries with 
democratic deficits face internal pressure they have, historically, 
sometimes tended to be adventurous.
Russia must therefore gain leverage by acting – from the 
European perspective – in irrational or unpredictable ways. It 
needs to use a broad scope of possible means – much more than 
only military ones – to achieve political goals.
Part of the answer is the building of military capabilities in 
Europe, but the key is a show of political unity and determi-
nation.
Robert Kupiecki
The systemic problems  
and modern challenges  
of NATO defense planning
The development of forces and capabilities to NATO’s require-
ments has been the imperative for all Allies since 1949. But de-
spite the obvious and vital link between articles 3 (self defence) 
and 5 (collective defence) of the Washington Treaty, NATO 
members have always had problems with meeting budgetary 
thresholds and military planning goals. All of this has manifest-
ed itself since the first Lisbon 1952 force goals were adopted (by 
consensus), and later on the famous benchmark of 3% GDP 
to be spent on defence. Therefore, such patterns of behaviour 
by some NATO members (described in academic studies as 
free-riding) are of a structural nature in the Alliance, and per-
haps any other resource-intensive international organization. 
They may result from the very nature of planning for the future 
and, more sharply, doing so in the (increasingly) multinational 
context. In this context however, NATO should be praised for 
its flexibility, adaptability and effectiveness in providing quality 
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solutions in such an ungenerous environment. Any effort to-
day to improve the interplay between the NATO defence plan-
ning process (NDPP) and national planning should start from 
a  thorough analysis of the obstacles to translating commonly 
identified Alliance requirements into specific targets. 
Many things have happened in and around NATO since 
1989 to further complicate these issues. To name just a few of 
them:
– more complex threats emerged, calling for new military – 
political instruments, seemingly downplaying territorial and 
collective defence needs,
– the pursuit of new low-intensity, out-of-area missions pushed 
the Alliance to develop different military capabilities than 
those required for large scale operations, sometimes at the 
expense of the latter, and sometimes simply by cutting-off 
“heavy” capabilities,
– natural competition for resources, both on the operational 
and infrastructural levels, blurred the understanding of mis-
sion unity and a  single set of forces – where collective de-
fence serves as the “referential mission” for the development 
of military capabilities,
– post-cold war NATO military adaptation brought some un-
wanted results: a  growing gap between objectives and de-
liverables in defence planning, an extra burden imposed on 
the capacity of a  reduced NATO command structure; and 
renationalization of some military processes,
– a peace dividend syndrome (exacerbated by the recent global 
financial crisis) brought about additional budget cuts, fewer 
forces, and a more (imperfectly functional) multinationality in 
the capability build-up process.
In the era of NATO-wide shrinking defense budgets and cuts 
in forces a sufficient synergy of Allied and national defense plan-
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ning is urgently required. Most likely, in the foreseeable future 
there are not going to be more troops or money for them. There-
fore, more solidarity in burden sharing, input-output measured 
financial efforts, and smarter multi-national programs are in 
great demand today, not as luxuries but as necessities.To remain 
militarily credible, NATO simply needs efficient forces and 
capabilities to conduct the full spectrum of operations, from 
low-intensity up to large-scale and combat ones. All of them, 
however, must grow from collective defence as the key NATO 
mission. A quick analysis of conflicts in NATO’s neighborhood 
strengthens the case for adequate military capabilities. Missions 
in Afghanistan and Libya have exposed some shortfalls in NA-
TO’s capabilities, including those critical for collective defense. 
Precision guided munitions, drones, and C2 for air operations 
are some of the most prominent examples. Russian aggression 
in Ukraine suggests that hybrid warfare might be a doctrinal, 
political (decision-making) and legal challenge for the Alliance. 
However it is never effective without its “hard military compo-
nent” – another proof that NATO should not turn a blind eye 
to traditional threats. Outside of NATO, the US led coalition 
against the so called Islamic State also requires proper military 
hardware. With the Wales summit decisions, NATO is on track 
in addressing its collective defense requirements, including ca-
pabilities and forces. This process should be built on the follow-
ing four assumptions:
First, collective defense should remain the key reference. 
Each time NATO undertakes action outside its borders, it 
should preserve capabilities and forces for collective defense. 
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine demonstrates that the classical 
conventional threat has not gone away from Europe.
Second, NATO’s main tool at hand – the Readiness Action 
Plan – should lead to NATO’s permanent adaptation to the 
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new strategic context. Some defence shortfalls had been identi-
fied well before Russian annexation of Crimea, and they mostly 
concerned heavy equipment and mobile capabilities. This hard 
stuff cannot be treated anymore as the legacy of the past, as it is 
an inseparable component of NATO’s deterrence and defense. 
ISAF has proven that it remains useful not only for collective 
defense. For this reason it should remain in national inventories. 
Allies should declare these forces to the NATO Defense Plan-
ning Process. This is the only way to ensure their effectiveness 
and usability.
Third, sufficient resources should be dedicated to defense. 
Defence budgets cannot any longer be viewed by governments 
as burdens, or the source of quick and easy savings; “Peace div-
idend syndrome” belongs to the past. However, in addition to 
what we spend, how we spend is equally important. Spending 
more and in a smarter way also emerges as a way to address the 
drastic imbalance in defence efforts between NATO Europe and 
the US.
Fourth, multinational opportunities for the development of 
capabilities should be used effectively and wisely. Such projects 
offer an opportunity to build capabilities, by groups of nations, 
in a cost-effective manner. However, multinational approaches 
make more sense, if they bring usable capabilities and the sav-
ings are re-invested in defense. If not, multinational projects 
would be a means for further cuts and the lowering of the level 
of NATO’s operational ambition. 
A case for a better NATO defense planning process
Collective defense planning has been one of the three key mech-
anisms that has made NATO unique and distinct from oth-
er forms of military-political cooperation. The other two are, 
obviously, permanent politico-military consultations and an 
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integrated command structure. Today, this trio is still the key 
to NATO’s success. Within this framework defence planning 
remains the most challenging process as a combination of polit-
ical decision-making, and purely technical elements. It is a dis-
tinct process with its own complex procedures. It is not easy 
for the planners. After all, if they knew everything about their 
job the system they create would be perfect. There would not 
be any governance problem, and all planning disciplines would 
smoothly interlock, thus creating an always-coherent product. 
To make things even more complicated, the defense planning 
process is hardly understandable for the decision-makers. At the 
same time, it is a tool for reaching political objectives defined 
by the political leaders. For this reason, it has to be better un-
derstood by them, and they should be more involved in the 
process. What needs to be highlighted here, in the first instance, 
is the fundamental role of defence planning in forging NATO’s 
political coherence and military effectiveness, as well as its heavy 
dependence on national planning. Alliance planning has gone 
a long way from a threat-based force planning focused on col-
lective defense, to a capability-driven process, involving all plan-
ning disciplines. Its goal is to cover all the current missions and 
tasks of the Alliance, including new mechanisms, in a  compre-
hensive approach. I find it particularly striking that some of the 
specific problems discussed by Allies over recent decades remain 
to a large extent the same today.
In June 2004, shortly before my departure from NATO HQ, 
where I served as deputy ambassador of Poland, the North At-
lantic Council had adjusted its planning procedures to reflect 
“the need for greater political visibility and ownership of key 
elements of the process, and the need to streamline the process”. 
Sound familiar? To me it resonates as a piece taken from the 
present ministerial communiques.To give you another example, 
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in 1980 Allies agreed to develop a “flexible framework for longer 
term defense planning”. Again, sound familiar? As early as 1955 
NATO Secretary General Lord Ismay was asked by the NAC to 
prepare “a procedure for multilateral consideration of changes 
in defense planning of members that would affect their contri-
butions to NATO”. Aren’t we discussing the same today? These 
two randomly selected examples from the past (and present) 
demonstrate the recurring motif in NATO defense planning, 
namely how to encourage nations to spend more on defense, 
and how to better connect national decisions with NATO goals.
NATO has to cope with the challenges inherent in its de-
fense planning on a daily basis: 1) developing credible and real-
istic plans covering all possible Allied missions, 2) coordinating 
those plans with national efforts, 3) implementating collectively 
agreed plans in an effective and cost-effective manner. In my 
understanding, a successful NDPP should be able to deliver in 
three major areas:
– first, prevent the re-nationalisation of defense policies of 
member states, namely by avoiding a situation in which Al-
lied planning has no, or very limited, regulatory impact on 
national planning; 
– second, influence, and where possible guide, national de-
cisions to build the capabilities needed to meet collectively 
agreed goals. After all the real strength of NATO comes from 
national forces providing muscle to Allied force structure. If 
they are absent, then the NATO command structure alone 
does not mean a lot;
– last, but not least, the defence planning process should en-
sure or facilitate the development and availability of capabil-
ities needed for the full range of Alliance missions.
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A few words on renationalisation
This has been the main internal challenge to NATO’s cohesion 
from the very outset, and remains the case now with a  leaner 
Alliance facing uncoordinated reductions in national capabil-
ities, triggered – among other factors – by the financial crisis. 
The termination of the ISAF mission in 2014 and the natural-
ly expected subsequent slow-down of the “operational” tempo 
of NATO may look like an opportunity for further unilateral 
defense cuts. Burden-sharing between the US and other Allies 
already has a very complex record, and any further reductions in 
European defense spending may, no doubt, complicate it even 
further. Then, the challenge for the NATO defence planning 
process is to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic link in a  way that 
would encourage Europe to develop more capabilities, and the 
US to keep Europe on their geopolitical radar-screen and con-
tinue to provide its share. In the European context, there are 
two distinct but closely related types of renationalisation risk. 
One is that some Allies, with the end of ISAF, might be tempt-
ed to abandon certain capabilities, considering them “an un-
necessary legacy of the past”. The other is that other nations 
may become even more sensitive about those cuts and decide 
to develop capabilities they believe are necessary for territorial 
defense. This might create divisions among Allies, leading to 
consequences going far beyond the area of defense planning.
This is not an abstract or theoretical academic concern. To avoid 
these renationalization risks, for the sake of NATO credibility, 
nations must be fully confident that planning goals genuinely 
reflect the whole spectrum of possible Alliance missions, corre-
sponding with threat perception. In this context, a cocky and 
militarily maverick Russia offers another reason to treat NATO 
collective defence pledges in a serious way.
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A few words about influencing national decisions
The NATO defence planning process must remain a top-down 
one in which a common vision of defense posture impacts na-
tional commitments. Expectations that it will simply “certify” 
whatever nations bring to the table, and confirm that Allies 
individually make only the right choices, are understandable 
for the simplicity of such assumptions. However, the prima-
ry role of NATO defense planning through its collective wis-
dom is not to satisfy nations. In practical terms it should make 
them equally unhappy, and pushed to develop the capabilities 
commonly required. Against this background, an increased 
political visibility of the process is a  must. In order for Al-
lied governments to be willing to meet NATO requirements 
in their national planning, the decision-makers in the capitals 
have to understand why should they act in the appropriate 
way.To this end, the agendas of NATO leaders need to include 
regular exchanges on all the key elements of defence planning. 
Probably there are ways of going even beyond this, by intro-
ducing this issue in a  smart way to our Heads of State and 
Government. In the context of political visibility, the active 
role of the NATO Secretary General and his own assessment 
of the present and future state of Alliance defense planning, 
would also be helpful. A competent political debate on NDPP 
should help our decision-makers in understanding the need 
to develop capabilities for the full spectrum of NATO mis-
sions, rather than leaving them with the impression that the 
already defined priorities should remain intact. In Poland, our 
national planning procedures have been centered around the 
NATO process. We largely copied its structure to our system, 
including all its phases. The adoption of the NATO approach 
to defense planning resulted in many other positive changes in 
the area of defense.
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NDPP can generate a  lot of trust among NATO members 
and be an important vehicle for change. And more importantly, 
Allies should capitalize on that, for instance, when looking for 
the best ways to implement the Smart Defense and Connect-
ed Forces Initiative. With the increased focus on multinational 
approaches, defence planning has a chance to become a mech-
anism of choice for nations. Both Smart Defense and CFI may 
influence NATO collective defense by increasing Allies’ inter-
dependence. NDPP, when supporting the development of such 
multinational projects, should be able to address concerns some 
countries may have with regard to a  growing dependence on 
other nations’ capabilities. There is no doubt that the idea looks 
like the right one – NDPP should, and can, influence national 
decisions to the benefit of the development of collective capa-
bilities. However, long term planning must be firmly based on 
common vision of the future, which takes into account the dif-
ferent geostrategic perspectives of the Allies and their specific 
national considerations. That common vision as a clear founda-
tion of a sound planning process may not easy to achieve, but it 
is a precondition for promoting a longer term focus of NDPP. 
On ensuring the availability of the required capabilities
NDPP is all about commitments and availability. Certainly, it 
was much more evident in the past, when forces and capabilities 
developed through defense planning were simply assigned to 
NATO commanders, and the only Allied mission was collective 
defense. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the principle 
of availability must be preserved in today’s more complex envi-
ronment if NATO planning is to remain militarily relevant.In 
this context it is necessary to maintain the connection between 
defense planning and operational planning. NDPP should con-
tinue to process experience from current operations and, equally 
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importantly, fully take into account article 5 contingency plan-
ning. For a number of Allies, contingency planning is critical for 
collective defense commitments. Availability of forces and capa-
bilities is indispensable for the execution of these plans. NDPP 
is the only viable framework in which to identify, preserve and, 
when required, develop these capabilities. 
The other challenge that NDPP has already tried to over-
come is accommodation of the EU planning perspective. This is 
a sensitive issue. I believe however that, even within the current 
constraints, it is possible to ensure better coordination, com-
plementarity and, as a  result, better availability of capabilities 
for both organizations.Options to be explored include a greater 
use of the NATO-EU Capability Group to discuss key NDPP 
issues, as well as better synchronization of the Planning and Re-
view Process with NATO defense planning activities.
Let me end with a bit of a “reality check”, namely with a few 
words about our defense efforts in Poland. We have adopted 
a multi-billion zloty program for the development and modern-
ization of our Armed Forces until 2022. These plans are clear-
ly concentrated on the modernization and development of our 
national defense capabilities. Their implementation will further 
increase Poland’s contribution to NATO, obviously through the 
NDPP. The key focal areas are air defense, and lower-tier The-
atre Missile Defense. These systems, when acquired by Poland, 
are intended to be declared part of NATO Ballistic Missile De-
fense. We also plan to further develop our fleets of utility and 
specialized helicopters, and armored personnel carriers, develop 
C4ISR systems, and modernize our Navy. Our geostrategic lo-
cation on NATO borders obviously impacts some choices relat-
ed to capabilities and structures. However, the effectiveness of 
the entire Alliance has been for a long time the point of refer-
ence for all our efforts related to capability development.
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Instead of a  conclusion, another word form the distant 
NATO past. In 1949 NATO adopted its first Strategic Concept. 
Its final part was about “cooperative measures” considered at 
that time to be “a prerequisite to the successful implementation 
of the common plans”, such as standardisation, combined train-
ing and exercises, cooperation in research and development of 
new weapons and so on. The introductory sentence to this part 
reads:“The essence of our overall concept is to develop a max-
imum of strength through collective defence planning”.This 
statement remains as valid today as it was in 1949. NATO de-
fence planning today, though different in scope and objectives 
from previous planning arrangements, is still about strength 
and solidarity. It continues to be indispensable to meet the ob-
jectives of the North Atlantic Treaty. 

Adam Daniel Rotfeld
The West and Russia:  
Are we facing the threat  
of a new Cold War between  
the West and Russia?
Who destabilized the world order? 
During the “Valdai” Conference, Vladimir Putin posed a ques-
tion: “What is actually happening in the world, why does it 
become less safe and less predictable, why the risks are on the 
rise everywhere?”1
In response to the theme of the conference World order: new 
rules of the game or world with no rules? the President of Russia 
gave a statement that may be confined to the following points:
1. The global and regional security systems are weakened, frag-
mented and deformed. This also applies to multilateral insti-
tutions and to cooperation in politics, economy and culture. 
2. The scheme of mutual limitations and balance that was 
shaped in the wake of World War II and post-war develop-
1 At: http://news.kremlin.ru/news/46860/print.
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ment allowed us to keep the international order under con-
trol. After the Cold War, it was necessary to reconstruct and 
adapt these schemes and the entire system to the new se-
curity environment in a rational way. However, the United 
States recognized that they are the winner of the Cold War 
and decided that looking for a new balance is unnecessary. It 
is the United States that is responsible for the dysfunctional 
character of the current security system on the global and 
regional scale.2
3. As a  consequence of political pressures and legal nihilism, 
the standards and principles of international law have been 
weakened. They were replaced by arbitrary assessments and 
free interpretation. According to Putin, this was accompa-
nied by total control of the global mass-media exercised by 
America, which consciously distorts the view and the assess-
ment of the world. The ambitions of one political power and 
its “satellites” are presented as the opinion of the entire in-
ternational community, and the loyalty to the one and only 
centre of political influence became the measure of legitima-
cy of regimes ruling various states. In short, President Putin 
accused the United States of attempting to adapt the interna-
tional system and global order to its interests–and of failing 
to consider other players on the international arena.3
2 In Sochi, Putin said: “The Cold War is over, but no peace was made in 
the form of clear and mutual arrangements on respecting the current 
or working out new rules and standards”. See: “Valdai” Conference, op. 
cit. In the article published in the New York Times (11 September 2013) 
Putin commented on President Obama’s statement: „And I would rath-
er disagree with a case he made on American exceptionalism, stating 
that the United States’ policy is ’what makes America different. It’s what 
makes us exceptional’. It is extremely dangerous to encourage people to 
see themselves as exceptional, whatever the motivation”.
3 Karon Demirjian and Michael Birnbaum, Russia’s Putin blames U.S. for 
destabilizing world order, The Washington Post, 24 October 2014. 
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The reasoning presented by Vladimir Puting to the partic-
ipants of the international “Valdai 2014” Conference may be 
summarized in Putin’s words that Russia “is not asking anyone 
for permission” in its conduct of world affairs.
Putin’s speech–dubbed the “new doctrine of Russia’s for-
eign policy” by the Russian media–is compared to the famous 
Churchill lecture given in Fulton. According to one of the 
Russian commentators, it confirms the worst expectations.4 
The original interpretation of the new Russian strategy may 
be brought down to a syllogism: as the old security system has 
worn out and is no longer binding, and a new one has not been 
agreed yet, Russia is free to determine what is lawful and what is 
not; the United States violated the rules of the game in Kosovo, 
Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, so Russia is entitled to do the same 
in the case of Ukraine.
There is no need to prove that the purpose of this reasoning 
is to legitimise and justify the right to lawlessness, to impose ar-
bitrary rules. Such an approach is accepted neither in the coun-
tries bordering Russia (the Baltic countries, Poland) nor in the 
entire transatlantic community (EU and NATO). This does not 
mean that there are no voices that would rationalise Russia’s 
stance and burden Western Civilization with the responsibility 
for the new assertive strategy adopted by the Russian leader.5 
A  theorist–one of the distinguished American realists–wrote 
in his analysis of international relations that the crisis in and 
around Ukraine is the responsibility of the West–The Liberal 
4 Konstantin Remchukov, Valdaisko-Fultonskoye vystupleniye Vladimira 
Putina potverdilo hudskiye ozhidaniya (Valdai-Fulton Vladimir Putin’s 
speech confirmed the worst expectations). Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 Octo-
ber 2014.
5 John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault? The 
Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin, Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2014.
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Delusions That Provoked Putin, to be exact.6 I do not perform 
a detailed analysis of the arguments that led the author to such 
a  conclusion, because there are already competent responses 
available worded by many experts and specialists in these is-
sues.7 I would only like to note that such “realistic” reasoning is 
to explain ex post that the political decision to expand NATO–
taken 20 years ago–is the source of the current crisis. Michael 
McFaul and Stephen Sestanovich are right in writing that this 
type of Realpolitik as a policy prescription “can be irrational and 
dangerous”. There is just a need to become aware of what the se-
curity of Central Europe and the entire democratic transatlantic 
community would look like now, had the contemporary leaders 
of the western world at the time lacked political wisdom and 
followed the recommendations of one of the realists from Chi-
cago, and other scholars from many other centres, who opposed 
consistently opposed the decision to expand NATO.
My first conclusion is: there is no causal link between ex-
panding NATO in the 1990s and the annexation of Crimea 
and the undeclared Russian military invasion in Ukraine two 
decades later, in the second decade of the 21st century. The 
use of such arguments by the state-controlled Russian me-
dia–television and press–does not mean that this was a crucial 
element in the decision-making of the Russian leaders. The 
direct grounds for the Russian intervention were the escape 
of President Viktor Yanukovych and the change of leaders in 
6 Michael McFaul and Stephen Sestanovich, Faulty Powers. Who Started 
the Ukraine Crisis?, Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2014. Also: John Korn-
blum, Ukraine and the West. The West Never Intended to Humiliate 
Russia, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 March 2014, p. 11; John 
Kornblum, Clowns Can’t Save the Old World Order, Welt am Sonntag, 7 
September 2014.
7 Michael McFaul and Stephen Sestanovich, op. cit.
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Ukraine. Most important is another factor; the main cause of 
Russia’s nervousness lies in the domestic situation in Russia 
and its failures to modernise the economic sector and the ex-
pected decrease of energy carrier prices, which constitute the 
main pillar of the Russian budget.
The argument that Ukraine landed in the hands of fascists 
and followers and descendants of Stepan Bandera is equally 
untrue. Presidential and parliamentary elections verified that 
assumption. It is true that there are nationalist and neofascist 
movements in Ukraine. But their role in Ukrainian political life 
is rather marginal.
The second conclusion is: the real cause of the Russian ac-
tions intended to destabilize Ukraine, to make it fragmented 
and subordinated and dependent on Russia, is the response and 
reaction to the pro-European programme and political choice 
made by the Kiev government. The Ukrainian determination 
is to introduce reforms, to modernise and to democratize the 
state. In other words, the Russian strategy is based on the fear 
that if the reforms in Ukraine do work, if–as in Georgia–corrup-
tion will be reduced and limited and an in-depth and genuine 
political transformation commences, sooner or later the peoples 
of Russia will also opt for such an orientation and direction of 
development.
And the third conclusion: Russia’s policy towards Ukraine is 
not a show of strength; it is the opposite: it is a demonstration 
of weakness. The might and power of a great nation in a time of 
peace does not rely on its accelerated militarisation programme, 
but on economic growth, modernisation, and new technologies 
and innovations. Russia is well equipped to become a centre of 
gravity for its neighbours, if it takes advantage of its natural 
resources and intellectual potential in a  rational way. Howev-
er, Russia has made a different choice. It chose the strategy of 
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rebuilding the empire and maintaining the traditional concept 
of zones of influence, or “privileged interests”. Russia’s poli-
cy towards the external world is based on weakening its sur-
roundings and neighbourhood–on destabilizing Ukraine, on 
the attempts to threaten and disintegrate the West. It con-
solidates its own society by upholding the myth of an eternal 
and external threat from the West. In reality, Russia’s borders 
have never been as safe and secure as they are now. Actual 
threats appear at the southern Russian borders and in Tajik-
istan, where the Russian army stands guard. These and other 
new threats might–and should be–the subject of cooperative 
relations between Russia and the North-Atlantic Treaty as far 
as Russia’s security is concerned, pursuant to the catalogue 
of common threats to NATO and Russia drafted in Lisbon 
during the NATO Council-Russia session in November 2010. 
That document has not lost any of its validity. The way back to 
cooperation in security is not blocked.
Russia’s objectives
In order to understand the new situation it seems essential 
that the attention of President Putin focuses not on shaping 
a new world order, but on establishing a political system in Rus-
sia that would ensure authoritarian governance in the long run. 
In other words, a system without alternatives, accepted by the 
society. Such a system is presented as Russia’s own original mod-
el of governance.
Is cooperation possible? In this context we should consider 
whether today’s Russia can be a partner to a democratic com-
munity of nations, a partner that wants to and will respect com-
mitments made in good faith.
The answer is qualified: yes, it can, if both parties stipulate 
and could arrange a binding framework for such cooperation. 
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1. Researchers often raise the issue of looking for institutional 
solutions. They assume that security structures and organi-
sations are static in nature (and that they are relevant to the 
needs and requirements adequate to the time in which they 
are established). In turn, risks, threats and challenges are dy-
namic in their nature. As a result, the mandates of security 
organisations do not correspond to new, changed and chang-
ing, needs.
This reasoning is logical and rational. Yet it does not ex-
plain the political essence of challenges. There are, for exam-
ple, organisations established to perform a given task which 
disappear after fulfilling their mandate, if the states do not 
manage to agree upon a new mandate for them.
Compared to many other international organisations, 
NATO is practically the only effective security institution 
of the Euro-Atlantic Community of States. Without it the 
European countries and their security would find themselves 
in the zone of risks and threats.
2. The Ukrainian conflict called for in-depth reflection among 
different groups of theorists and scholars. It restored the role 
of the military factor and its role in preventing conflicts. Gen-
erating threats is the new Russian strategy. However, NATO, 
in line with the NATO 2020 Strategic Concept adopted in 
Lisbon, should follow the intention to cooperate with Russia 
on the one hand, and to deter a potential aggressor on the 
other.8
3. A hypothesis is often formed in this context, as if the world 
and Europe were at risk of another cold war. This stems 
8 Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence 
and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in 
Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010. 
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from thinking in a category of the past. Today’s threats are of 
a different nature. During the Cold War, East-West relations 
were subject to ideological differences that permeated all and 
any layers of relations between the two blocks–the politics, 
the economy, the military and humanitarian issues. After-
wards we saw a de-ideologization of international relations. 
However, in non-democratic countries this meant a  return 
to treating military potential as a pressuring tool and an en-
forcement tool, and as a  way to weaken countries and to 
press on them to be subordinated to stronger neighbouring 
powers. This is a blunt return to the concept of “zones of in-
fluence” or “area of privileged interests”, in which the global 
powers are seemingly entitled and legitimized to surround 
themselves with weak nations dependent on them. The poli-
tics of today’s Russia towards Ukraine is supported by many 
Western nationalist and chauvinist, or even clearly fascist, 
politicians and movements. President Putin is shown and 
presented by the Russian mass media as a conservative lead-
er. This conservatism is understood today as a force which is 
fighting with liberal and democratic ideas and concepts of 
world governance.
This new ideological and political hybrid has become one 
of the main obstacles to building a community of North-At-
lantic security together with Russia which would respect 
a catalogue of commonly agreed universal values.
4. The international security system in a  transitory period is 
quite often characterised by uncertainty, instability, and 
a certain level of imbalance. Hence the political unpredicta-
bility. It is a situation and set of conditions in which the old 
threats have not disappeared, but there are no new effective 
mechanisms and procedures for preventing and counteract-
ing new risks and challenges. These include the fomented 
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secessions and wars of rebellion that destabilize countries, 
weaken them and allow for the achievement of political, eco-
nomic and military aims per procura–without involving your 
own armed forces on the territory of the state against whom 
these measures are addressed9.
This requires undertaking action, not working on a new 
theory. Relevant decisions were made in Newport during the 
last NATO Summit.10
5. The time is ripe to demonstrate some creativity about a new 
quality of relationship between NATO and the EU. This is 
also connected with the need to increase military expendi-
ture and to adapt military budgets to new military threats. In 
practice, this will be possible if the internal resistance within 
the EU States is overcome and if a decision is made on the 
joint defence and security of NATO and EU countries in 
common.
In this context, a particular place and role in the defence 
alliance of the West has to be taken by the new relationship 
9 In the context of the measures intended to weaken Ukraine, destablize 
it politically, introduce dysfunctionality and commence the process of 
partition of that country, Russian military publications (Niezavisimoye 
Voyennoye Obozreniye, Znanije–Włast) recalled the concept of “re-
bellion-wars” authored by Evgeny Messner (1891–1974). In the 1960s 
Messner published a series of works in Argentina, focused on a new con-
cept of war: Miatież–imia trietjej wsiemirnoj; Wsiemirnaja miatieżwojna 
(Moscow: Kuczkowo Pole, 2004). The main assumptions come down to 
the fact that rebellion-wars are battles for the souls of a warring nation. 
The actions carried out in the western and southern Ukraine are a per-
fect example of this theory. More: Putin walczy o duszę Rosji (Putin is 
fighting for Russia’s soul). An interview with Adam D. Rotfeld, Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 26 March 2014, pp. 10–11).
10 Wales Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Govern-
ment of the North Atlantic Council in Wales. Newport, 5 September 
2014.
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between Germany and USA. Robert Zoellick is right, when 
he writes: “It is time for both sides to launch a serious stra-
tegic dialogue about the changing world. Germany still lives 
on a frontier–but not of contesting armies. It is now on the 
frontier of contending ideas. (…) Strategic vision must be 
connected to public support. Perhaps German sensitivities 
to the past, combined with an American focus on the future, 
can forge a wise partnership for another generation.”11
6. In the current situation groups comprised of intellectuals, 
thinkers and scholars and former politicians should make the 
decision-makers aware that the time is ripe for reevaluating 
the old and working out new concepts that meet the current 
needs. I would like to make a  reference here to the Aspen 
Ministers Forum and the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative. 
A new initiative is taken up also by the European Leadership 
Network, which last summer produced a paper on Greater 
Europe. This idea, as proposed by the ELN, developed the 
old concept that security has to be based on cooperation. It 
requires innovative thinking among the managing executive 
groups of both transatlantic security and defence organisa-
tions.12 The starting point for the effective implementation 
of the common strategy of building sustainable peace and 
security in Europe should be a common perception and un-
derstanding of the threats by all the countries of the transat-
lantic community. 
The Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe report on cri-
sis management, drafted in July 2014, stated that the existing in-
11 Robert Zoellick, Germans must show their country can still be a force 
for freedom, Financial Times, 26 October 2014. 
12 This concept was discussed in Warsaw (30 May 2014) on the basis of 
A Task Force Position Paper on Crisis Management in Europe in the Con-
text of Events in Ukraine.
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struments of emergency response between NATO and Russia and 
between the EU and Russia are inadequate to the new challenges. 
In reality, the EU and Russia have no commonly agreed proce-
dures for preventing and resolving crises. The authors13 recom-
mend that NATO, the EU and Russia follow the following rules: 
•	 Exercise	full	military	and	political	restraint	and	take	steps	to	
encourage and ensure the military and political restraint of 
all of their relevant allies and partners in the wider region;
•	 Embrace	increased	military-to-military	communication,	in-
formation exchange and transparency measures in the inter-
ests of all, and; 
•	 Engage	in	direct	dialogue	with	each	other	as	an	accompani-
ment to dialogue between the parties inside Ukraine and be-
tween Ukrainian parties and other actors outside the country. 
These recommendations are not very innovative and rather 
modest, as their authors were not only Western experts but also 
representatives of the moderate semi-official political analysts 
from Russia that have no deciding voice in the Russian estab-
lishment.
The most recent ELN Report of November 10, 2014, con-
tains the following recommendations:
First, that the Russian leadership should urgently re-evalu-
ate the costs and risks of continuing its more assertive military 
13 The works were presented by former politicians and intellectuals from 
the United Kingdom (Des Browne, former Minister of Defence and Mal-
colm Rifkind, former Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs), France 
(Paul Quilès and Hervé Morin–former Ministers of Defence), Germany 
(Volker Rühe, former Minister of Defence), Spain (Ana de Palacio, for-
mer Minister of Foreign Affairs), Turkey and a group of former Rus-
sian politicians (Igor Ivanov, Vitaliy Trubnikov, Igor Yurgens, Anatoly 
Adamishin and others). Both co-chairs of the Polish-Russian Group for 
Difficult Affairs took part in the works of that team – academic Anatoly 
Torkunov and professor Adam D. Rotfeld.
76 Adam Daniel Rotfeld
posture, and Western diplomacy should be aimed at persuading 
Russia to move in this direction, in its own as well as everyone 
else’s national security interests.
Second, that all sides should exercise military and political 
restraint and political leaders should review their military rules 
of engagement to ensure restraint at all levels of command, and 
to reduce any potential for an actual exchange of fire.
Finally, all sides must improve military-to-military commu-
nication and transparency to increase stability and predictabil-
ity by increasing warning and decision time for leaders. The 
alternative is to perpetuate a  situation in which mistrust, fear 
and shortened leadership decision times characterise a volatile 
stand-off between a nuclear armed state and a nuclear armed 
alliance.
Concluding remarks
The problems that led to a crisis in EU-Russia and NATO-Rus-
sia relations reflect far-reaching differences in politics, culture 
and psychology, in understanding what significance is attribut-
ed to values in determining strategic goals and the implemen-
tation of them. Therefore, solutions should aim to confirm the 
binding character of the current political and legal principles 
and commitments. The new rules have to be worked out in the 
areas and on the issues for which they are necessary.
The 40th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act 
is a proper moment in which to define the priorities of strategies 
for co-operation and joint solutions for NATO after the New-
port Summit, addressed to Russia under OSCE auspices, may 
take under consideration some immediate steps and measures 
aimed at:
First, the prevention a direct military conflict between the 
West and Russia; 
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Second, the development of the political, economic and mil-
itary conditions for a durable and just peaceful settlement of the 
crisis in and around Ukraine;
Third, the strengthening of the Special Monitoring Mission 
and other OSCE Missions to Ukraine and establishment of 
a multilateral mechanism for monitoring and supervising the 
implementation of the ceasefire agreement “Minsk II”;
Fourth, elaborating a framework for the lasting political set-
tlement of the Ukraine crisis within the new European security 
order based on: 
•	 Confirmation	of	the	OSCE	Decalogue	of	principles–sover-
eignty of States; non-use of force; inviolability of disputes; 
non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights; 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples; co-operation 
among States; and fulfillment in good faith of obligations 
under international law;
•	 Elaboration	 of	 innovative	 and	 adequate	 (to	 the	 new	 risks	
and threats) military and non-military confidence- and secu-
rity-building measures, including the rejection of some old 
ideas like “zones of influence” or “privileged interests” for 
great powers as irreconcilable with the principle of sovereign-
ty and equal rights of all the OSCE member states; 
•	 Revitalization	and	reactivation	of	the	negotiation	of	the	Eu-
ropean conventional arms control process and new sets of 
CSBMs under OSCE auspices;
•	 The	core	and	fundamental	political	component	of	a new	Eu-
ropean order has to be both the inviolability of the national 
territories of states and the incontestability of internal polit-
ical order;14
14 As suggested by the German SWP Report–Markus Kaim, Hanns 
W. Maull and Kirsten Westphal, The Pan-European Order at the Cross-
roads: Three Principles for a  New Beginning. SWP Comments, 2015, 
No. 18, p. 5.
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•	 Adjustment	 of	 the	 existing	 institutions	 and	 organs	 to	 the	
new tasks and challenges (“not everything has to be reinvent-
ed, but many things could be rediscovered”15). Some OSCE 
mechanisms could be upgraded–i.e. the OSCE Permanent 
Council composed of heads of missions in Vienna may be re-
constructed and transformed into the Euro-Atlantic Security 
Forum on a higher political level; and the OSCE Conflict 
Prevention Center (CPC) mandate might be strengthened 
within the possible new Conflict Prevention and Crisis Man-
agement Center.16
The time is ripe to initiate the process of negotiations with 
the aim of finding the common security denominator for the 
West and Russia in the form of a new security arrangement. 
Such a negotiated compromise has to reconcile both different 
perceptions of threat and adversarial national security inter-
ests.
In the second decade of the 21st century, the major threats 
to international security are of non-conventional nature. They 
appear mainly within the nations and not between them. The 
source of these threats lies in non-democratic governance and 
in trampling on universal values. Non-conventional challeng-
es require adequate and non-conventional political and mili-
tary strategies.
15 Ibid., p. 7.
16 Max van der Stoel, the first CSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, was right in his judgement: “The durable prevention (…) 
requires a  long-term perspective. It involves building a viable democ-
racy and its institutions, creating confidence between the government 
and the population, structuring the protection and promotion of human 
rights, the elimination of all forms of gender or racial discrimination 
and respect for minorities”. In: The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. 
The Experience of the CSCE (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
1994), p. 53.
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The time has come to counteract new threats in an active 
and creative, instead of passive and reactive, manner. Demo-
cratic Western states should determine objectives and means of 
shaping the new political order at the regional and global scales. 
These principles and rules pertain up to now to relations be-
tween the States. However, as after the end of the Cold War, 
conflicts and crises are born within nations and not between 
them–preventing and resolving critical situations should also 
be internal and domestic. This is addressed both to small and 
medium countries as well as the global powers. Even though we 
know that conflicts are born within countries, we keep looking 
for solutions within the framework of international relations. 
And this is a new challenge for us all. This challenge is not only 
political, but also intellectual. Politicians have the right to ex-
pect answers and recommendations from thinkers, scholars and 
independent intellectuals.

Marcin Kozieł
NATO confronts the Ukrainian crisis
I have lived for five years in Ukraine and I have had a chance to 
observe the conflict that is taking place there from a local per-
spective. In other words, I currently live in the place where a war 
of a different type is taking place – a war which in my opinion 
should have an essential meaning for our thinking about the na-
ture of conflict in the 21st century. And thinking what I could 
tell you today, I came to the conclusion that I will present a few 
thoughts, a  few personal reflections on a  theme of the conse-
quences of the war in Ukraine for NATO’s collective security. 
So far a lot of things have been said about this conflict, but basic 
elements of its nature still require more analysis.
We face a few basic groups of issues, concerning the relation 
between the war on Ukraine and the collective protection of the 
Euro-Atlantic area. Some of them have the character of chal-
lenges for strategy analysis; others indicate the necessity for re-
flection on the consequences of this conflict for NATO defense 
planning. First of all, I think that we have to remember the fact 
that the summit in Newport and the follow- up discussion of 
Euro-Atlantic security has obviously concentrated on the phe-
nomenon of the “hybrid war”. This is natural because activities 
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of the kind we face in Ukraine are so serious that all analytical 
and planning effort is now oriented to this phenomenon and 
the consequences connected with it. Pure concentrating on sce-
narios which we saw, so to say ”live”, in the real situations of 
“the last war” is not a new phenomenon in the area of strategic 
planning. That is the way it is; the previous war always shapes 
our analytical horizon, defines the directions of reactions to 
threats and helps to produce assumptions for defense planning.
So far I assume that we should bear in mind the very specific 
context of the war in Ukraine and not use “schemes” in our stra-
tegic thinking which would suggest that this drama experienced 
by our Ukrainian friends will inevitably extend also to the terri-
tory of the Alliance. In the other words, let’s not limit ourselves 
to ”schemes” in strategic thinking and let’s not plan according 
to the challenges of the last war.
In Ukraine, the conflict resembling a “hybrid war” takes place 
in a specific political, social and cultural environment. It is dif-
ficult to plan for this type of conflict in most NATO countries; 
actually the scenario from Ukraine would not, in my opinion, 
be possible in most of NATO’s member states. I will even risk 
the statement that this type of action wouldn’t be possible in the 
central part of Ukraine, and certainly not in western Ukraine. 
It would be impossible because of a specific regional Ukrainian 
context which, as far as I am concerned, defines the possibili-
ties for conducting concrete operational activity in a particular 
cultural and social environment existing in some regions of this 
country (let’s not forget how diverse a country Ukraine is). In 
other words, the scenario from Donbas, the scenario from Lu-
gansk, scenarios from Crimea would be very difficult to repeat. 
Probably in these regions they would meet a different reaction 
from local defense forces and a different reaction of society and 
so on.
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I suppose that the application of the scenario with which we 
had to deal in western parts of Ukraine on the NATO’s respon-
sibility area would also be impossible. Therefore, the first thesis 
which I would like to share in the light of assumptions from 
Newport, particularly in the context of discussion about NA-
TO’s responsibility, is that when thinking about ”threats of the 
future” we cannot concentrate only on ”the Ukrainian scenar-
io”. Obviously this does not mean that in our plans we should 
not reflect the consequences of the crisis on Ukraine.
My second thesis, which I would also like to formulate on the 
basis of personal experience from my stay in Ukraine – and here 
I would like to offer some parallel between the war in Ukraine 
and that what could possibly happen in NATO’s member states 
– is the very complex nature of this conflict, as far as I am con-
cerned, beyond considerations of a defense nature.
Here we get into the subject of understanding the war as 
a pure political phenomenon. The hybrid war in Ukraine had 
two components and about one of them not much is spoken; 
actually it is not even presented as a part of this conflict. The 
first component was a growing political conflict, lasting a few 
years, which reached its climax when the then president Yanu-
kovych decided not to sign up to the Association Agreement 
with the European Union. This political-social conflict, which 
was played out in Ukraine from around 2010, was a political 
factor of a new type of war. If we consider the security of the 
Alliance, in analyzing strategic and planning aspects connected 
with new possible threats to collective defense we also have to 
analyze a character of “political” threats. What can this mean in 
practice?
Wars on NATO territory do not, and probably will not, have 
to be played only with the involvement of defense forces, para-
military formations, organized crime groups or groups of mer-
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cenaries. Wars on the territory of the Alliance might have the 
character of an inner socio–political crisis which might last for 
years. And I think that in the context of such a situation a par-
ticularly important thing to do is to maintain the political cohe-
siveness of the North Atlantic Alliance. However, maintaining 
the inner social cohesiveness of states should also be a very im-
portant element of strategy. In a situation of crisis which might 
take place on the territory of member states, particularly in case 
of the lack of clarity about a  scenario taking place on a  terri-
tory of the member state, it will be particularly important to 
keep coherence within societies of member states. Without it, 
destabilization might occur inside these countries, particularly 
in a the case of the appearance of a serious social conflict or use 
of paramilitary organizations in order to create chaos and an 
atmosphere of a fear.
In such a scenario, civil society has to play a particular role. It 
has to support state authorities by having an influence through 
activities designed to lead society to the awareness that not every 
conflict, and not every situation connected with particular, dra-
matically serious events, has to immediately lead to war or a loss 
of state control. Here I mean the need to keep calm in situa-
tions of serious socio–political conflict, particularly when we 
face actions of a character difficult to define. Civil society can 
also face a need to support local authorities in the realization of 
their main functions connected with, for example, the delivery 
of basic resources to a population, for example following attacks 
on the energy infrastructure of a state.
Obviously, a strong reaction of security forces in such a situa-
tion is as important as the keeping of successful civil–democrat-
ic control over the security sector. Therefore, one of the lessons 
of the Ukraine crisis is the need to understand the meaning 
of civil society in a “new type” conflict. In the context of the 
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events in Ukraine, it is also very important to put real emphasis 
on the development of efficient tools of strategic and tactical 
analysis for a collective defense planning. Very often, in the case 
of a war of a “new type”, particularly in the first phase of its de-
velopment, it is not clear what kind of scenario we face. This is 
what has happened in Ukraine and this is what we also have to 
consider in our analysis about both threats to the Euro-Atlantic 
region and appropriate reactions to them.
When it comes to operational planning, it is of decisive im-
portance that analyses of military exercises in the vicinity of 
NATO territories be made, focusing on their possible impli-
cations for the Alliance. At the same time this type of analysis 
will not be complete if it does not, as I said before, include an 
assessment of specific socio–cultural contexts, in which frames 
can appear for specific scenarios of actions. Forgive me, but one 
more time I will put a particular emphasis on the socio–cultural 
aspect; it seems to be very important for understanding wars of 
the “new type”, both in the context of the Ukraine crisis and the 
security situation in the south of Europe.
Where military forces are concerned, special forces are a crit-
ically important component of a  reaction to unconventional 
events on the territory of member states. It is they which would 
probably be the most efficient tool for having an influence on 
an aggressor (or aggressors) in such a  “new type” war against 
a NATO member state. There is also important internal com-
ponent: security forces, police, border services, counterintelli-
gence services and so on. Therefore, in order to react efficiently 
in a ”hybrid war”, NATO should develop the possibility of deep 
operative cooperation with European Union, which has a well 
developed component of internal security. It is critical for the 
ability to react to various threats of the “new type”, including 
the threat of terrorism and the activities of paramilitary forces.
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After the summit in Newport, the discussion of Kiev’s pos-
sible directions for security policy now has acquired a  crucial 
meaning in the context of events in the East of the country. In 
expert circles there are various options considered: connection 
of Ukraine to a  collective system of security, continuation of 
the “outside-block” policy (that is leaving Ukraine outside of 
political–military organizations), basing the security of Ukraine 
on multilateral agreements in a regional range or the participa-
tion of the country in the European Security and Defense Policy 
in the context of the Association Agreement with the EU. The 
decision over the strategic directions of Kiev’s security policy 
has not been taken yet. I expect that it will be taken after the 
parliamentary election, and it will certainly be announced in 
the new edition of Ukraine’s National Security Strategy, which 
is currently in development. It is obvious, too, that the further 
evolution of the security situation in regions facing conflict will 
have significant meaning for the direction of Ukrainian security 
policy.
I would like to finish my paper by once more referring to as-
sumptions deriving from the war in Ukraine, which in my opin-
ion are crucial for understanding the new character of this war 
and its influence on the collective protection of the North At-
lantic area: the war of a ”new type” does not have to necessarily 
mean direct military action; political, social, psychological and 
cultural activities are also crucial components. The understand-
ing of the possibility and probability of particular actions in 
a cultural environment is, therefore, crucial to the formulation 
of an efficient reaction to this kind of threat. Much in this type 
of conflict depends on whether we are prepared for its escalation 
and whether we define the sources of possible threat and aims of 
an aggressor in good time.
Robert Pszczel
Russia’s response  
to the NATO summit in Wales
If I were to sum up the key achievements of the summit in New-
port I would venture to say that leaders of 28 Allied countries 
managed successfully to strike a balance in terms of responding 
to the security threats emanating from the east and from the 
south. When the meeting was planned (in Chicago a couple of 
years ago) hardly anybody could predict that the Alliance – and 
international community more broadly – would be confronted 
at the same time with such unprecedented events as Russia’s 
aggressive actions against Ukraine and instability on a massive 
scale in our southern neighbourhood.
NATO does not have the luxury of choosing security chal-
lenges – it must tackle all those which member states consider 
important for their security, and for peace, security and stability 
in a wider world. This is why it is was so important that Allies 
reached political consensus on both analysis and prescription 
for the tasks in front of NATO.
Of course, the most direct and original response agreed in 
Newport is the so called NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP). 
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The rationale for it is rather straightforward. Substantial and 
serious changes have taken place in the security environment. 
They demand a coherent and efficient response. And in the true 
meaning of the “one for all, all for one” motto of NATO it must 
have a collective format. The essence of RAP is a comprehensive 
set of measures which a) address a need to reassure Allies – this is 
a short and mid-term goal, and b) contribute to the adaptation 
of the Alliance’s military posture – which obviously is a more 
long-term process.
More specifically, it was decided to enhance the NATO Re-
sponse Force (NRF) and to establish a  Very High Readiness 
Joint Task Force (VJTF) (it is the latter decision which received 
biggest media coverage). I know, NATO is very fond of com-
plicated names. That is why this long term is already described 
in more human terms as a Spearhead Force. It will be able to 
deploy within literally a few days, especially if there was a need 
to respond to challenges on NATO’s periphery – be it in the 
east, in the south or any other direction.
There will be more exercises – on sea, in the air and on land, 
command and control presence will be established on the terri-
tory of eastern members together with prepositioning of equip-
ment and supplies there. In short, there will be more NATO in 
those countries. NATO will do this collectively to reassure Allies 
particularly worried by the Russian annexation of Crimea and 
its use of force in Ukraine.
One must stress that Allies perceive Russian actions as a di-
rect breach of international law and a variety of agreements, 
including the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997. But NA-
TO’s measures will remain purely defensive, proportionate and 
in line with the Alliance’s own commitments. It is not a secret 
that there was a  discussion prior to and during the summit 
concerning the consequences of these blatant violations of 
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agreements with Russia. But in a testimony to NATO’s unity 
it was decided that Allies will continue to respect the rules-
based European security architecture. One hopes that Moscow 
will appreciate this political signal, although the first omens 
are not good. We have already seen comments from Russian 
authorities admitting that an increased military presence on 
the territory of new members will be implemented in line with 
the Founding Act, i.e. through rotations. However, in their 
commentary the Russians complained that such steps are just 
as bad as a permanent presence would be! Surely yet another 
proof that Moscow is caught in its own web of contradictory 
propaganda…
Allies confirmed that NATO is not seeking confrontation 
and poses no threat to Russia. But at the same time they also 
made it abundantly clear that they will not compromise on the 
principles underpinning the very nature of NATO as a  trans-
atlantic Alliance and the most fundamental rules governing se-
curity on our continent. That is why Newport signaled to the 
whole world the firm commitment and support of NATO to 
Ukraine, a victim of Russian aggression. There is no ambiguity 
in the unified position of all 28 Allies backing Ukraine’s sover-
eignty, territorial integrity within its internationally recognized 
borders (which include Crimea) and independence. The cam-
paign of violence staged by Russia and Russian-backed separa-
tists is aimed at destabilizing Ukraine as a sovereign state – and 
we will not allow Russia to cover up this fact.
Allied leaders also offered a  lot of practical support to 
Ukrainian President Poroshenko, with whom they spoke with 
at a  separate meeting in Newport. NATO as an organization 
and Allies individually will vigorously assist Ukraine with its 
indispensable reforms, including in the defence and security 
sector. While NATO is not a party to any military operations in 
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Ukraine we will help this country to develop a better capacity 
to defend itself.
Russia and Ukraine were without doubt two leading topics 
during summit deliberations. But Allies came out in favour of 
a significant contribution to the resolution of crises in the south 
too. One of the key elements is the framework of NATO’s De-
fence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, soon 
to be offered to Iraq, as well as a variety of other steps aimed at 
enhancing the ability of the countries in the broad Middle East 
region to tackle the menace of ISIL and other terrorist groups. 
NATO leaders also gave a  blessing to a  variety of initiatives 
the implementation of which will make the organization even 
stronger and better suited to do the jobs it may have to do in 
the future. One – Allies endorsed or reinforced a  number of 
initiatives focusing on enhancing interoperability among mem-
ber states (e.g. framework nation projects) and with partners 
(e.g. Interoperability Platform). Two – a big pledge was made at 
the highest level to spend a minimum of 2 percent of GDP on 
defence by 2020. Three – NATO reiterated its determination 
to see through the security gains reached through such stabiliz-
ing operations as those in Afghanistan or Kosovo. Four – New-
port saw further decisions which confirm the Alliance’s political 
will and ensure capabilities to face up to the most sophisticated 
modern challenges, such as cyber or missile attacks.
I have already mentioned the rather disappointing reac-
tion of Moscow to the summit in Newport. Unfortunately, 
it reflects the predictable anti-NATO, anti-Western narrative 
which is the norm these days in Russia. We stand accused – on 
a daily basis, on TV, radio and in newspapers, in the parlia-
ment, by official think-tanks etc. – of every sin under the sun. 
It is allegedly NATO which has violated the Founding Act, 
it is the Allies who have “destabilized Ukraine” and it is in 
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fact the whole democratic community of nations which has 
become a Russophobic club plotting continuously on how to 
bring harm to Mother Russia. 
There are times when my job in Moscow as Director of the 
NATO Information Office consists of nothing else but attempts 
to respond to a variety of nonsensical conspiracy theories. No, 
NATO was not planning to land its special forces in Sevastopol 
to establish a base there. No, there are no NATO units fight-
ing in eastern Ukraine. No, we are not taking part in seminars 
organized in Russian universities in order to brainwash young 
students.
The list of myths, blatant lies and fabricated stories is very 
long. The problem is that the growing clampdown on freedom 
and liberty of thought in Russia has elevated to the status of 
mainstream those views which even few years ago were regarded 
as marginal, beyond the pale. One can only venture a guess that 
for some people demonizing NATO, the EU, the US, Ukraine 
and “boring” democratic standards conveniently serves some 
political objectives in Russia.
In other words, public discourse in Russia is in permanent 
overdrive when it comes to the creation (and sustainment) of 
enemy images. One cannot be optimistic about prospects for 
better relations between Russia and the West unless this Krem-
lin-sanctioned narrative is abandoned.
This rhetoric looks all the more provocative as it clearly tries 
to misinform domestic and external publics about the basic 
facts of Russian policy. And these are rather simple, not to say 
black and white: it is Russia which has trampled all over inter-
national law by using force to invade a neighbouring country. 
And it continues to violate these norms by further destabilizing 
it. Russian public opinion is evidently in denial when it express-
es surprise that the level of trust in Russia and its promises has 
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dropped dramatically – and across the world. This is not just 
a collective psychology problem.
Aggressive propaganda underpins a  variety of actions and 
statements which create at least an impression of military brink-
manship. Russia is spending huge amounts of money on rear-
mament (e.g. an additional 80 bln $ alone next year) and the 
bulk of this is going to be spent on offensive arms and weapons 
systems. Moreover, a country which has already shown a will to 
use force against its neighbours is conducting massive exercises 
without any advance warning, without the notification envis-
aged in international transparency regimes – exercises involv-
ing attack scenarios, even simulating nuclear strikes… And it is 
Russian officials and politicians who more frequently use threats 
against other countries, including NATO members.
This is a cause of justified concern. And, for an organization 
such as NATO, a reason to take necessary defensive measures 
and adopt a vigilant posture. This is exactly what the alliance 
will do in the months to come. We will implement RAP meas-
ures. We will assist partner countries in need of defence reforms. 
We will support Ukraine.
And we will be doing this in a determined but patient man-
ner. Because Allies have no desire to engage in confrontation. 
We would all love to see Russia come back to the path of coop-
eration and respect for international agreements. There will no 
doubt be wobbles on this road, sometimes heated debates (as 
befits democracies). But nobody should be in any doubt about 
the long-term unity of Allies when it comes to adherence to the 
values and standards which NATO was created to protect in 
1949. This mission remains as valid today as it was more than 
60 years ago. 28 muskeeteers, NATO Allies, will not shrink 
from their collective responsibilities.
Artur Gruszczak
Euro-Atlantic security policy  
after NATO’s Wales Summit: 
Grappling with functional overload
The meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales was con-
vened to confront a set of challenges which emerged in its close 
neighbourhood and to ask tough questions about the Alliance’s 
capabilities to adjust to a  rapidly changing security environ-
ment. The results of the summit in Newport could not satisfy 
many expectations with regard to the current problems, chal-
lenges and dangers provoked by dysfunctional state and non-
state actors located in direct proximity to the North Atlantic 
area. The Wales Summit’s outcomes provoked mixed reactions, 
positively reverberating in some European capitals but also ech-
oing long-standing reservations and concerns about NATO’s 
real position in the Euro-Atlantic world.
In my contribution to this volume, I would rather focus on 
the internal prerequisites, determinants and dynamics which 
have shaped NATO’s policies and actions in the post-Lisbon 
strategic framework. I will advance the thesis that Euro-Atlantic 
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security policy is determined to a large extent by NATO’s func-
tional adaptation capabilities, which in recent years were sig-
nificantly reduced by internal fissions and external burdens. As 
a result, the role of NATO has been diminishing due to its inca-
pability to adopt and launch a comprehensive proactive security 
strategy. The Wales Summit gave, for the first time in a  long 
while, an appropriate response to the new security challenges 
facing the Alliance, especially to military threats generated by 
state and non-state actors on its eastern flank. It did not dispel 
controversy over the identity and credibility of the Alliance yet 
made it important to search for a new posture responding to 
accumulated challenges and threats.
The Wales Summit coincided with the accumulation of 
negative tendencies in NATO’s external environment and the 
deepening of internal problems and tensions in several member 
states. European and Euro-Atlantic security is confronted, with 
an increasingly complex and hostile environment determined 
by the following factors:
•	 Russia’s	aggressive	and	confrontational	policies;
•	 radical	and	militant	Islam;
•	 information	war	and	cyber	warfare;
•	 strong	 challengers	 to	 NATO’s	 role	 as	 a  collective	 security	
provider.
Within the Alliance, the organization and its member states 
coped with numerous problems and questions addressing the 
following issues:
•	 the	challenge	of	austerity;
•	 the	redefinition	of	NATO’s	global	role;
•	 the	problem	of	collective	defence	and	deterrence;
•	 the	Afghan	syndrome.
The functional overload was generated by the dynamics of 
the transformation of the global security environment after the 
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end of the Cold War. NATO, as the major player in Europe 
headed by the victorious “hegemonic power”, i.e. the United 
States, was confronted with challenges, problems and dilemmas 
emerging in two dimensions:
•	 horizontal,	entailing	local,	regional,	continental	and	inter-re-
gional security issues, often conflict-driven and demanding 
a systemic solution;
•	 vertical,	addressing	security	issues	with	reference	to	old	and	
new categories and focusing on transnational and multidi-
mensional threats.
The horizontal dimension of NATO’s security dilemma had 
a  lot to do with the transformation of the European security 
system following the end of the Cold War. NATO’s “going out 
of area” was motivated by its main security concerns, which 
were located in the post-Soviet area and the Balkans.1 Despite 
Russia’s diplomatic resistance, the eastern enlargement in 1999 
effectively consolidated NATO as a  truly Euro-Atlantic com-
munity strongly dedicated to the original objectives set out 
in the Washington Treaty.2 The decision to use military force 
in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999 responded to the Alliance’s aspi-
ration to be “very much in business”3 in European security, even 
if it challenged directly the legal foundations of international 
co-existence.
1 Ivan Dinev Ivanov, Transforming NATO: new allies, missions, and capa-
bilities (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), pp. 77–79.
2 Jeffrey Simon, NATO enlargement and Russia, in: A. Braun (ed.), 
NATO–Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Abingdon and 
New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 92–98.
3 Allusion to Senator Lugar’s famous statement of 1993 about NATO go-
ing either out of area or out of business. Comp. Ellen Williams, Out of 
Area and Very Much in Business? NATO, the U.S., and the Post-9/11 
International Security Environment, Comparative Strategy, 2008, 27(1), 
pp. 65–78.
96 Artur Gruszczak
In contrast to the late 1990s, marked by the cautious going 
out of the North Atlantic area to restore stability in the Balkans, 
the new century witnessed an “interventionist overstretch”4. 
NATO’s invasion of Afghanistan, the military intervention in 
Libya, maritime operations in the Mediterranean and the Gulf 
of Aden, the military training mission in Iraq as well as the con-
tinuous presence in the Balkans were pertinent to the global 
projection of threats and challenges to security of the North 
Atlantic area and national security of the Allies. Fear of rapidly 
proliferating threats (terrorism, radicalism, piracy, illegal traf-
ficking), emerging in peripheral disorganized areas, or “shatter-
belts”, underpinned global concerns and stimulated further en-
gagement in operational activities. What is “out of area” became 
less important than what is “within the North Atlantic area”. 
NATO, according to former Secretary General Lord Robertson, 
should be prepared ‘‘to act wherever our security and the safety 
of our people demand action.”5 Therefore, NATO dispatched 
its troops thousands of kilometers away from the external bor-
ders of the North Atlantic area and offered its assistance to sev-
eral African and Asian countries which were on the brink of 
collapse. This was the case of non-military expeditionary activ-
ities, including the relief mission in Pakistan and the assistance 
given to the African Union in strengthening its peacekeeping 
capabilities.
4 Bastian Giegerich and Gerhard Kümmel, “The End of the World as We 
Know it”!? On Interventionist Overstretch, Post-Interventionism and 
Neo-Interventionism: An Essayist Introduction, in: G. Kümmel and 
B.  Giegerich (eds.), The Armed Forces: Towards a  Post-Interventionist 
Era? (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2013), p. 11.
5 Lord Robertson, NATO: A Vision for 2012, speech at a conference by the 
German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels, 3 October 2002. 
At: www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021003a.htm.
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Since the decline of the Soviet bloc and the final breakdown 
of communism in Eastern Europe NATO has systematically 
expanded its security agenda, incorporating new structural el-
ements and priority issues. The scope of matters of interest and 
concern to NATO steadily widened; apart from “hard” security 
issues, like military conflicts, the arms race, the proliferation of 
WMD, terrorism, ethnic clashes or civil strife, “soft” and human 
security elements, like energy security, climate change, religious 
fundamentalism and radicalization, political extremism, cyber 
threats, water scarcity and health risks have also been encom-
passed.6 This catalogue was systematically expanded, coming to 
a climax at the end of the 2000s with the issuing of the 2008 
Bucharest Summit declaration, the 2009 Declaration on Alli-
ance Security at the summit in Strasbourg/Kehl, marking the 
60th anniversary of the Washington Treaty, and the new strategic 
concept for defense and security adopted at the 2010 Lisbon 
Summit.
NATO put a  particular emphasis in these documents on 
“new, increasingly global threats, such as terrorism, the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction, their means of deliv-
ery and cyber attacks” and highlighted other challenges, such as 
“energy security, climate change, as well as instability emanating 
from fragile and failed states”.7 The new strategic concept “Ac-
6 See Arita Holmberg, The changing role of NATO: exploring the impli-
cations for security governance and legitimacy, European Security, 2011, 
20(4), pp. 529–546; Carl Cavanagh Hodge, Strategic drift in the expe-
ditionary era: NATO in the new world, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 
2007, 5(1), pp. 25–42; Karl-Heinz Kamp, Towards a New Strategy for 
NATO, Survival, 2009, 51(4), pp. 21–27.
7 Declaration on Alliance Security. Issued by the Heads of State and Gov-
ernment participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009. At: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/na-
tolive/news_52838.htm?mode=pressrelease.
98 Artur Gruszczak
tive Engagement, Modern Defence”, contained the following 
point: “Key environmental and resource constraints, including 
health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing ener-
gy needs will further shape the future security environment in 
areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significant-
ly affect NATO planning and operations.”8
The above declarations and concepts provided clear evi-
dence that the Alliance evolved toward global issues, calling for 
non-traditional solutions instead of cultivating post-Cold War 
anxieties. The question was how NATO should corroborate its 
dominant strategic position in the global security system given 
the overloaded agenda, austerity measures and rising political 
costs of its global outreach. The 2012 Chicago Summit gave 
the first signs of NATO’s lowering agenda. The concept of 
“Smart Defense”, put forward by Secretary General Rasmussen 
in 2011, was elevated to the rank of the key element of NA-
TO’s new approach to global security and transatlantic defense. 
The Connected Forces Initiative seemed to enhance and exploit 
effects of synergetic links between the Allies’ military, civilian, 
technological and organizational capabilities.
The Afghan trauma, reinforced by the strategic retreat from 
Iraq, contributed to a  tendency to marginalize the Alliance 
on the main stage of global politics. The Russian-Georgian 
war of 2008 manifested the lack of prudence within NATO 
and shortsightedness with regard to the Kremlin. It also raised 
serious reservations as to the real capacity and willingness 
to react to a  potential interference of Russia in internal af-
8 Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence 
and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in 
Lisbon 19–20 November 2010 (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Di-
vision, 2010), p. 13.
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fairs of NATO member states, particularly the former Soviet 
countries (such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) and former 
members of the Warsaw Pact. NATO’s military engagement 
in civil war in Libya initially met with reluctance on the part 
of several member states including the United States, which 
considered Libya as a primarily European problem.9 The re-
bellion against the Gaddafi regime was successful in toppling 
the dictator yet it also contributed to the final assessment of 
NATO’s military operation as an effective humanitarian inter-
vention.10 It showed, however, that not every member state is 
ready to bear the burden of a military contribution to an allied 
intervention11.
At the prestigious annual Munich Security Conference in 
2013, Secretary General Rasmussen signaled that NATO had 
to shift from “operational engagement to operational readiness. 
From campaign to contingency. From deployed NATO to pre-
9 Jeffrey H. Michaels, NATO After Libya, The RUSI Journal, 2011, 156(6), 
p. 57.
10 See Alan J. Kuperman, A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing 
NATO’s Libya Campaign, International Security, 2013, 38(1), pp. 105–
136; Jolyon Howorth, Humanitarian intervention and post-conflict 
reconstruction in the post-Cold War era: a provisional balance-sheet, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2013, 26(2), pp. 288–309.
11 See Jason W Davidson, France, Britain and the intervention in Lib-
ya: an integrated analysis, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 
2013, 26(2), pp. 310–329; Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer, To-
wards a  ‘post-American’ alliance? NATO burden-sharing after Libya, 
International Affairs, 2012, 88(2), pp. 313–327; Ivo H. Dadlder and 
James G.  Stavridis, NATO’S Victory in Libya, Foreign Affairs, 2012, 
91(2), pp. 2–7; Jeffrey Michaels, Able but not willing: a critical assess-
ment of NATO’s Libya intervention, in: K. Engelbrekt, M. Mohlin and 
Ch. Wagnsson (eds.), The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned 
from the Campaign (Abingdon – New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 17–40.
100 Artur Gruszczak
pared NATO”.12 This stance was motivated by “expeditionary 
fatigue”, the meager results of the military engagement “from 
the Balkans to the Hindu Kush” and growing concerns over 
negative repercussions for NATO member states’ security and 
stability. The NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan brought 
mixed results. The Alliance was capable of holding back the 
Taleban, keeping the Karzai clan in power and destroying al Qa-
eda’s strongholds. However, it completely failed to reconstruct 
the Afghan state and society, making the modernization project 
part of the counterinsurgency strategy and turning Afghanistan 
into a test-case of Western-type post-conflict transformation.
NATO’s overloaded agenda, which has been territorial, ex-
peditionary, and focused on hard security measures, has shaped 
in recent years the Alliance’s agency in the global security en-
vironment. NATO was consolidated as a  military organiza-
tion performing traditional roles of territorial defense and de-
terrence and combining them with non-Article 5, out-of-area 
expeditionary missions which in effect moved the framework 
of its security field far away from the geographical confines 
of the North Atlantic area. Recent developments in Ukraine, 
Syria and Iraq – countries bordering on NATO members – re-
minded the Allies that crises and dangers may originate in the 
immediate neighborhood and make up an extremely complex 
entanglement of threats, pressures and problems reverberating 
across the North Atlantic area and interfering directly in some 
member states. This means that the steps to lower the securi-
ty agenda taken from the beginning of the 2010s and relieve 
NATO of the most demanding and expensive tasks have to be 
12 NATO after ISAF: staying successful together. Remarks by NATO Sec-
retary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Munich Security Con-
ference, 2 February 2013. At: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opin-
ions_94321.htm.
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reconsidered.13 Growing resistance from some Allies to main-
tain, or even increase, their capacity to deliver, in terms of fi-
nancial input, military capabilities and combat readiness is an 
obvious challenge. The problem of burden-sharing still needs 
to be tackled in a responsible and consensual way. Certainly, it 
did not emerge in the 21st century, concomitant with NATO’s 
military involvement in the Balkans, Afghanistan or Libya. It 
reflects a  perpetual asymmetry in the Alliance resulting from 
divergent views among the Member States as to the meaning 
of Article 3 of the Washington Treaty.14 The dominance of the 
United States was quite often interpreted by some members of 
the North Atlantic community as an excuse not to increase their 
military spending and the uneven distribution of defense costs 
was considered to be NATO’s “natural” feature. High-spending 
allies were critical towards the “free riding” practiced by smaller 
states. However, they could not lower their profile without sof-
tening their military preparedness and at the cost of reducing 
their defense capabilities.15
With the advent of Russia’s aggressive policy toward her 
Ukrainian neighbor, NATO’s global strategy needs to reconcile 
new missions with traditional defence roles. Steps taken by the 
North Atlantic Alliance in the aftermath of this Russian aggres-
13 See Mark Webber, Ellen Hallams and Martin A. Smith, Repairing NA-
TO’s motors, International Affairs, 2014, 90(4), pp. 773–793.
14 Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty (the so called “burden-sharing 
Article”) provides that “the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of 
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and de-
velop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”. See: 
The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. – 4 April 1949. At: http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.
15 See Jens Ringsmose, NATO Burden-Sharing Redux: Continuity and 
Change after the Cold War, Contemporary Security Policy, 2010, 31(2), 
pp. 324–326.
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sion were marked by a general consensus as to the illegal na-
ture of the military intervention and negative repercussions for 
European security. However, as the “devil was in the details”, 
decisions taken by the Allies were a  kind of lowest common 
denominator worked out in the face of the gravest security cri-
sis in post-Cold War Europe. Reasons for the relatively limited 
response should be found in the national interests and policies 
of NATO members, in divergent views of European security, 
Russia’s status and the limits of sovereignty of contemporary 
nation-states. What prevailed was the strong belief of several 
member states in Russia as an intrinsic element of European 
and global security structures. Russia is still perceived as a smart 
and efficient player not only in the former Soviet area, but also 
in the Balkans, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia. 
Therefore, a direct confrontation with Russia through the use 
of diplomatic, financial, economic and information tools could 
inflict harm to stability in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area 
and could, above all, hamper the de-escalation of the conflict in 
Ukraine and undermine the prospects for an effective and dura-
ble solution to this crisis. NATO’s mild response to the Russian 
strategy toward Ukraine was focused on reiterating the Allies’ 
commitment to collective defense safeguards under Article 5 yet 
not on enhancing the readiness to react in the case of a direct 
threat to a given NATO member’s sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity or vital national security interests.16
The Wales Summit brought about a clarification of the se-
curity concerns and strategic priorities of the Alliance. The dec-
laration issued by the Heads of State and Government opened 
16 Jakub Kufčák, NATO after the Wales Summit: Readying the Alliance for 
the Future, Policy Paper, 3/2014 (Prague: Association for International 
Affairs, 2014), p. 4. At: http://www.amo.cz/editor/image/produkty1_
soubory/amocz_pp_2014_03.pdf.
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with the following statement: “Russia’s aggressive actions against 
Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe 
whole, free, and at peace.” It was added in the following part of 
the document that “The Alliance does not seek confrontation 
and poses no threat to Russia. But we cannot and will not com-
promise on the principles on which our Alliance and security 
in Europe and North America rest. NATO is both transparent 
and predictable, and we are resolved to display endurance and 
resilience, as we have done since the founding of our Alliance.”17 
This wording suggests that NATO goes back to its roots, ech-
oing a  suggestion put forward in 2010 by Andrew Bacevich, 
an American scholar and retired career officer, in the following 
sentence: “If NATO has a future, it will find that future back 
where the Alliance began: in Europe. NATO’s founding mission 
of guaranteeing the security of European democracies has lost 
none of its relevance. Although the Soviet threat has vanished, 
Russia remains.”18
Drawing the red line is not enough in the face of the Krem-
lin’s assertive and often provocative stance. Russia’s military ac-
tivities are not limited to the territory of Ukraine. The escala-
tion of incidents provoked by Russian aircrafts, submarines and 
vessels evidently challenges NATO’s preparedness and response 
capability. Authors of a  report on new Russian posturing for-
mulate such a warning: “These events form a highly disturbing 
picture of violations of national airspace, emergency scrambles, 
narrowly avoided mid-air collisions, close encounters at sea, and 
17 Wales Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Govern-
ment participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Wales from 4 to 5 September 2014. At: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/na-
tohq/official_texts_112964.htm
18 Andrew Bacevich, Let Europe Be Europe, Foreign Policy, March/April 
2010, p. 72
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other dangerous actions happening on a regular basis over a very 
wide geographical area.”19 Russia’s strategy demands a coherent 
NATO response in many dimensions. The summit in Newport 
sent a clear message that NATO seeks to rebuild unity and iden-
tity around vital security interests in Europe. Having declared 
that, the Alliance has to work out on a consensual and perma-
nent basis a clear-cut security posture highlighting the predom-
inant interests and sticking to the 2010 security concept.
The leaders of the member states have to realize that NATO 
is not and cannot be a sort of multifunctional tool envisioned 
to give itself a chance to survive. As Peter van Ham concluded 
in his apt wording, “In his multifunctionality, NATO begins to 
resemble a Swiss pocket-knife with all its tools exposed. But as 
we all know, unfolded pocket-knives are unwieldy affairs, and 
whilst prepared to do everything, are actually good at noth-
ing”.20
The only sensible way to overcome the risk of functional 
overload is to concentrate means and capabilities on the funda-
mental objectives and tasks which for decades have determined 
the course of NATO’s action.
19 Thomas Frear, Łukasz Kulesa and Ian Kearns, Dangerous Brinkman-
ship: Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West in 2014, 
Policy Brief, European Leadership Network, November 2014. At: http://
www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2014/11/09/6375e-
3da/Dangerous%20Brinkmanship.pdf.
20 Peter van Ham, NATO and the Madonna Curve: why a new Strategic 
Concept is vital, NATO Review, March 2008. At: http://www.nato.int/
docu/Review/2008/03/ART5/EN/index.htm.
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